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Executive	  summary	  
Tanzania	  has	  achieved	  significant	  growth	  performances	  since	  2005,	  despite	  poor	  scores	  on	  
its	  governance	  indicators,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  and	  
government	  effectiveness.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  more	  diversified	  and	  productive	  economy	  
is	  both	  the	  outcome,	  and	  the	  main	  driving	  force,	  behind	  incremental	  improvements	  in	  the	  
governance	  performances.	  The	  possibility	  of	  triggering	  this	  circular	  and	  cumulative	  process	  
of	  structural	  transformation	  requires	  both	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  
settlement	  in	  Tanzania,	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  corruption	  hindering	  
development	  outcomes	  in	  the	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  paper	  offers	  an	  in-­‐
depth	  analysis	  of	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  issues,	  and	  their	  interdependencies,	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  
on	  the	  recent	  evolution	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  since	  the	  election	  of	  the	  new	  President	  
John	  Pombe	  Magufuli	  in	  October	  2015.	  
The	  paper	  provides	  an	  introductory	  overview	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  economy,	  
with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  main	  features	  of	  its	  productive	  structure.	  Against	  this	  background,	  we	  
then	  develop	  an	  in-­‐depth	  political	  settlement	  analysis	  of	  Tanzania	  since	  its	  independence.	  In	  
particular,	  we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  ongoing	  transformation	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  under	  
the	  new	  President	  Magufuli	  and	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  approach,	  given	  the	  existing	  legal	  and	  
institutional	  framework.	  While	  the	  political	  settlement	  is	  still	  in	  flux,	  we	  provide	  evidence	  of	  
the	  emerging	  trends	  in	  both	  governance	  interdependencies	  and	  private	  sector,	  and	  sketch	  a	  
set	  of	  potential	  future	  scenarios.	  The	  analysis	  of	  these	  emerging	  trends	  suggests	  that	  
Magufuli’s	  presidency	  has	  been	  gradually	  shifting	  from	  what	  we	  have	  called	  a	  “Bulldozer	  
phase”	  to	  a	  “Builder	  phase”.	  Specifically,	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  his	  presidency	  was	  characterised	  
by:	  (i)	  centralisation	  of	  power;	  (ii)	  an	  authoritarian	  approach	  towards	  the	  private	  sector;	  (iii)	  
increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  oppositions	  and	  media.	  However,	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  Magufuli’s	  
presidency	  has	  been	  increasingly	  characterised	  by:	  (i)	  institutionalisation	  of	  power	  within	  
CCM,	  and	  coalition	  building;	  (ii)	  disciplining	  rents,	  with	  a	  “pragmatic	  approach”,	  including	  
direct	  involvement	  in	  deals	  making;	  (iii)	  systematic	  repression	  of	  the	  oppositions	  and	  the	  
media.	  
We	  argue	  that	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  approach	  reflects	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  vulnerable	  
authoritarian	  coalition,	  and	  thus,	  the	  current	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania.	  
Notwithstanding,	  the	  paper	  provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  President’s	  attempts	  to	  shift	  towards	  a	  
more	  developmental	  state	  coalition	  configuration	  in	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  his	  Presidency.	  
While	  we	  acknowledge	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts,	  we	  also	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  
potential	  weaknesses	  in	  his	  mainly	  ‘vertical	  approach’	  to	  anti-­‐corruption.	  Thus,	  we	  identify	  a	  
number	  of	  strategic	  opportunities	  for	  complementing	  vertical	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  with	  
a	  more	  ‘horizontal’	  approach	  characterised	  by	  incremental,	  sector	  specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies.	  The	  paper	  concludes	  by	  sketching	  the	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Evidence	  programme’s	  
approach	  to	  developing	  feasible	  and	  high	  impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies,	  and	  by	  providing	  
some	  introductory	  references	  to	  the	  envisioned	  strategic	  opportunities	  and	  criteria	  for	  how	  
chosen	  sectors	  have	  been	  selected.	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1. Introduction	  
Tanzania	  has	  achieved	  significant	  growth	  performances	  since	  2005,	  despite	  poor	  scores	  on	  
its	  governance	  indicators,	  especially	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  and	  government	  effectiveness	  
indicators	  (Figure	  1).	  If	  we	  benchmark	  Tanzania	  against	  its	  two	  main	  regional	  comparators	  -­‐	  
Kenya	  and	  South	  Africa	  -­‐	  we	  find	  that	  since	  2005	  Tanzania	  has	  shown	  worse	  scores	  in	  
government	  effectiveness	  and	  a	  dramatic	  negative	  trend	  in	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  
indicator.	  On	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  indicator,	  Tanzania	  also	  scores	  much	  lower	  than	  South	  Africa,	  
but	  just	  above	  Kenya.	  However,	  while	  Kenya	  has	  improved	  its	  rule	  of	  law	  since	  2011,	  
Tanzania	  is	  on	  a	  downward	  trend.	  Tanzania	  also	  has	  the	  worst	  scores	  in	  regulatory	  quality	  
and	  has	  not	  shown	  any	  signs	  of	  improvement	  since	  2005.	  Similarly,	  the	  indicator	  for	  voice	  
and	  accountability	  has	  not	  improved,	  although	  it	  is	  comparable	  to	  Kenya.	  Tanzania	  has	  
traditionally	  performed	  well	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  stability,	  and	  in	  fact	  even	  outperformed	  
South	  Africa	  in	  the	  late	  2000s.	  However,	  the	  political	  stability	  has	  declined	  since	  2013.	  
Figure	  1:	  World	  Governance	  Indicators,	  Tanzania	  and	  comparators,	  2005-­‐2015	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The	  business	  sector	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  identified	  corruption	  as	  one	  of	  the	  top	  five	  constraining	  
factors	  in	  the	  country	  (Figure	  2).	  Although	  in	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum’s	  Executive	  Opinion	  
Survey,	  corruption	  is	  only	  the	  fourth	  most	  important	  factor	  hindering	  businesses,	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  factors	  –	  for	  example,	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  infrastructures	  –	  are	  also	  directly	  affected	  by	  
corruption.	  Thus,	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption	  can	  be	  much	  more	  significant	  than	  the	  survey	  
suggests.	  The	  pervasiveness	  of	  corruption,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies,	  was	  also	  highlighted	  by	  the	  very	  recent	  reports	  and	  presentations	  produced	  by	  the	  
Tanzanian	  National	  Business	  Council	  (TNBC,	  2017)	  and	  the	  Tanzanian	  Private	  Sector	  
Foundation	  (TPSF,	  2017)	  at	  the	  recent	  private-­‐public	  sector	  dialogue	  hosted	  by	  TNBC	  (10	  May	  
2017).	  A	  number	  of	  sectoral	  priorities	  were	  highlighted,	  including	  tax	  reforms,	  trade	  and	  
custom	  rules	  enforcement,	  smuggling	  and	  counterfeits,	  agricultural	  inputs	  and	  land.	  
Figure	  2:	  Most	  problematic	  factors	  for	  doing	  business	  in	  Tanzania,	  2015	  
	  
Source:	  Executive	  Opinion	  Survey	  (World	  Economic	  Forum	  2016)	  
In	  2000	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  articulated	  its	  long-­‐term	  agenda	  in	  the	  Tanzania	  
Development	  Vision	  2025.	  Since	  then,	  medium	  and	  long	  term	  strategies	  and	  development	  
plans	  have	  increasingly	  stressed	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  economic	  growth	  –	  its	  inclusiveness	  and	  
sustainability	  –	  will	  require	  a	  structural	  transformation	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  
more	  diversified	  and	  productive	  economy	  is	  both	  the	  outcome	  of,	  and	  the	  main	  driving	  force	  
behind,	  incremental	  improvements	  in	  the	  governance	  performances,	  in	  particular	  control	  of	  
corruption	  (Khan,	  2006	  and	  2010;	  Khan	  et	  al,	  2017).	  The	  possibility	  of	  triggering	  this	  circular	  
and	  cumulative	  process	  of	  structural	  transformation	  requires	  both	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania,	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	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Building	  on	  this	  research	  framework	  and	  agenda,	  the	  paper	  provides	  an	  introductory	  
overview	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  economy,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  main	  features	  
of	  its	  productive	  structure.	  Against	  this	  background,	  we	  then	  develop	  an	  in-­‐depth	  political	  
settlement	  analysis	  of	  Tanzania	  since	  its	  independence.	  In	  particular,	  we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  
ongoing	  transformation	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  under	  the	  new	  President	  Magufuli	  and	  his	  
anti-­‐corruption	  approach,	  given	  the	  existing	  legal	  and	  institutional	  framework.	  While	  the	  
political	  settlement	  is	  still	  in	  flux	  we	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  emerging	  trends	  in	  both	  
governance	  interdependencies	  and	  private	  sector,	  and	  sketch	  a	  set	  of	  potential	  future	  
scenarios.	  	  
We	  argue	  that	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  approach	  reflects	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  vulnerable	  
authoritarian	  coalition,	  and	  thus,	  the	  current	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania.	  
Notwithstanding,	  the	  paper	  provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  President’s	  first	  attempts	  to	  shift	  
towards	  a	  more	  developmental	  state	  coalition	  configuration	  in	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  its	  
Presidency.	  While	  we	  acknowledge	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts,	  we	  also	  point	  to	  a	  
number	  of	  potential	  weaknesses	  in	  his	  mainly	  ‘vertical	  approach’	  to	  anti-­‐corruption.	  Thus,	  
we	  identify	  a	  number	  of	  strategic	  opportunities	  for	  complementing	  vertical	  anti-­‐corruption	  
measures	  with	  a	  more	  ‘horizontal’	  approach	  characterised	  by	  incremental,	  sector	  specific	  
anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  The	  paper	  concludes	  by	  sketching	  the	  ACE	  approach	  in	  developing	  
feasible	  and	  high	  impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  and	  by	  providing	  some	  introductory	  
references	  to	  the	  envisioned	  strategic	  opportunities	  and	  criteria	  for	  sector	  selection.	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2. Major	  sectors	  and	  drivers	  of	  
growth	  in	  Tanzania	  	  
Tanzania	  is	  a	  fast	  growing	  economy,	  with	  rates	  above	  the	  average	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  since	  
2005,	  and	  good	  macroeconomic	  performances	  (IMF,	  2017).	  Economic	  growth	  was	  robust	  
during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2016	  and	  is	  projected	  to	  remain	  at	  about	  7	  percent	  until	  2020	  (Table	  1	  
and	  Figure	  3).	  
Table	  1:	  Macroeconomic	  indicators,	  2014/15	  –	  2020/21	  
	   2014/15	   2015/16	   2016/17	   2017/18	   2018/19	   2019/20	   2020/21	  
Real	  GDP	  growth(%)	   7	   7	   6.9	   7	   6.9	   6.7	   6.5	  
Inflation	  (YOY,	  %,	  end-­‐period)	   6.1	   5.5	   5	   5	   5	   5	   5	  
Overall	  fiscal	  balance	  (cash	  basis,%	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐3.3	   -­‐3.5	   -­‐4.6	   -­‐4.6	   -­‐4.5	   -­‐4.5	   -­‐3.7	  
Government	  capital	  spending	  (%	  of	  GDP)	   4.4	   4.5	   9.7	   8.8	   8.7	   8.9	   8.1	  
External	  current	  account	  balance	  (%	  of	  GDP)	   9.8	   -­‐5.6	   -­‐7.5	   -­‐7.5	   -­‐7.4	   -­‐7.4	   -­‐6.8	  
Gross	  international	  reserves	  	  
(months	  of	  next	  year's	  imports)	  
4.5	   3.5	   3.8	   3.9	   4.1	   4.2	   4.3	  
Sources:	  Tanzanian	  authorities	  and	  IMF	  staff	  projections	  (IMF,	  January	  2017)	  
Figure	  3:	  Tanzania	  and	  comparators:	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  benchmarking	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  World	  Bank	  
While	  the	  quantum	  of	  growth	  is	  certainly	  important,	  the	  Tanzanian	  Development	  Vision	  
(TDV)	  and	  the	  Long	  Term	  Perspective	  Plans	  (LTPPs)	  recognise	  that	  manufacturing-­‐led	  
structural	  transformation	  is	  the	  only	  pathway	  for	  a	  more	  inclusive	  society,	  sustained	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(FYDP	  II	  2015/16	  –	  2020/21)	  is	  centred	  on	  the	  need	  to	  boost	  industrialisation	  and	  
productivity	  growth	  across	  the	  economy,	  especially	  targeting	  light	  manufacturing	  and	  
resource-­‐based	  industries.	  Indeed,	  Tanzania’s	  economy	  is	  still	  mainly	  based	  on	  the	  
agricultural	  sector,	  contributing	  23	  percent	  of	  the	  country	  GDP,	  and	  employing	  
approximately	  two-­‐thirds	  (67	  percent)	  of	  the	  workforce	  (Figure	  4).	  
Figure	  4:	  Sectoral	  value	  addition	  and	  contribution	  (%)	  to	  GDP	  	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  World	  Bank	  
The	  sector	  also	  contributes	  approximately	  65	  percent	  of	  inputs	  to	  the	  industrial	  sector,	  
especially	  agribusiness	  and	  the	  food	  industry	  (URT,	  2016).	  Over	  the	  last	  years	  the	  agricultural	  
sector	  has	  been	  growing	  at	  4	  percent	  per	  annum,	  well	  below	  the	  6	  percent	  target	  set	  in	  the	  
first	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan,	  2010-­‐15.	  These	  performances	  are	  partially	  due	  to	  
bottlenecks	  within	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  –	  e.g.	  access	  to	  quality	  inputs,	  finance	  and	  
commercialisation	  challenges	  –	  but	  also	  inter-­‐sectoral	  issues	  such	  as	  import	  dependence,	  
smuggling	  of	  key	  commodities	  like	  rice	  and	  sugar,	  and	  limited	  processing	  capabilities	  in	  
agribusiness	  (Figure	  5).	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Figure	  5:	  Sectoral	  value	  added	  annual	  growth	  rates	  (%)	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  World	  Bank	  
The	  twin	  policy	  goal	  of	  the	  FYDP	  II	  is	  to	  create	  –	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  –	  more	  and	  
better	  jobs	  via	  manufacturing	  development	  and	  the	  industrialisation	  of	  the	  agricultural	  
sector.	  This	  policy	  agenda	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  compelling	  evidence	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
development	  as	  a	  “process	  of	  production	  transformation,	  led	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  collective	  
capabilities	  and	  resulting	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  good	  quality	  jobs	  and	  sustainable	  structural	  
change”	  (Andreoni	  and	  Chang,	  2017).	  As	  Figure	  6	  shows,	  countries	  who	  managed	  to	  reach	  a	  
high	  level	  of	  human	  development	  (UNDP	  Human	  Development	  Index)	  are	  also	  those	  who	  
managed	  to	  reach	  high	  level	  of	  industrial	  competitiveness	  (UNIDO	  Competitive	  Industrial	  
Performance	  Index).	  This	  correlation	  points	  to	  the	  intrinsic	  relationships	  linking	  social	  
development	  and	  production	  transformation.	  Triggering	  such	  production	  transformation	  in	  
the	  Tanzanian	  context	  means:	  (i)	  manufacturing	  agrarian	  change	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  (Kay,	  
2009;	  Andreoni,	  2011);	  (ii)	  diversifying	  the	  economy	  along	  different	  industrialisation	  
pathways;	  (iii)	  supporting	  the	  development	  of	  a	  local	  production	  system	  (Andreoni,	  2018);	  
(iv)	  developing	  export	  capabilities	  towards	  higher	  quality	  products	  and	  beyond	  mineral	  
exports;	  (v)	  exploiting	  domestic	  and	  regional	  market	  opportunities	  for	  industrial	  learning	  
(Andreoni,	  2017;	  EAC,	  2017).	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Figure	  6:	  Relationship	  between	  industrial	  development	  and	  human	  development,	  2010	  
	  
Source:	  EAC	  Report,	  2017;	  Author’s	  adaptation	  based	  on	  indicators	  computed	  by	  UNDP	  and	  UNIDO,	  2010	  
Manufacturing	  development	  is	  the	  most	  fundamental	  engine	  of	  structural	  transformation,	  as	  
it	  triggers	  productivity	  increases	  across	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  via	  backward	  and	  forward	  
linkages,	  technological	  innovation	  and	  organisational	  capabilities	  development	  (Hirschman,	  
1958;	  Kaldor	  1967;	  Andreoni	  and	  Scazzieri,	  2013;	  Andreoni	  and	  Chang,	  2017;	  Khan,	  2017;	  
Haraguchi,	  2017;	  Andreoni,	  2018).	  After	  a	  decade	  of	  manufacturing	  upsurge,	  Tanzania	  is	  
today	  at	  a	  crossroad	  (MITI,	  2016).	  Despite	  the	  upward	  trend	  of	  its	  manufacturing	  value	  
added	  (MVA)	  per	  capita,	  it	  remains	  significantly	  lower	  than	  Kenya.	  Moreover,	  the	  overall	  
contribution	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  to	  GDP	  is	  still	  below	  10	  percent	  (Figure	  7).	  	  
Manufacturing	  firms’	  capacity	  to	  increase	  value	  addition	  and	  diversify	  their	  production	  
output	  are	  also	  lagging	  behind,	  as	  revealed	  by	  Tanzania’s	  export	  performances	  (Figure	  7).	  
The	  share	  of	  manufactured	  products	  in	  total	  exports	  has	  increased	  thanks	  to	  some	  positive	  
trends	  in	  food,	  beverages,	  tobacco	  and	  fixed	  vegetable	  oil;	  however,	  Tanzania	  still	  depends	  
largely	  on	  gold,	  copper	  and	  precious	  metals	  export	  (around	  35	  percent	  of	  total	  export).	  
Tanzania’s	  penetration	  in	  its	  two	  main	  regional	  markets	  (EAC	  and	  SADC)	  remains	  also	  limited	  
and	  negative	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  balance	  of	  trade	  and	  regional	  value	  chain	  integration,	  for	  
example	  in	  the	  cotton	  and	  textile	  industries	  (MITI,	  2016	  and	  EAC,	  2017).	  The	  over-­‐
dependence	  on	  imports	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  remains	  a	  structural	  problem,	  although	  
imports	  have	  been	  declining	  since	  2011.	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Figure	  7:	  Balance	  of	  trade	  and	  export	  basket	  composition,	  2000-­‐2010-­‐2014	  
	   	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  UNCTAD	  and	  EAC	  Report,	  2017.	  
Tanzania’s	  poor	  performances	  are	  driven	  by	  multiple	  interdependent	  factors,	  among	  which	  
five	  are	  worth	  mentioning.	  First,	  the	  domestic	  production	  system	  is	  disarticulated,	  that	  is,	  
there	  are	  no	  signs	  of	  increasing	  development	  of	  backward	  and	  forward	  linkages	  between	  
different	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy1.	  Moreover,	  the	  Tanzanian	  production	  system	  presents	  a	  
“dualistic	  structure”	  (Andreoni,	  2017	  and	  2018).	  Around	  80%	  of	  the	  value	  addition	  in	  
manufacturing	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  mining)	  is	  produced	  by	  firms	  with	  more	  than	  100	  employees,	  
while	  the	  rest	  remain	  excluded	  and	  operate	  in	  a	  semi-­‐informal	  regime	  (Figure	  8).	  The	  
majority	  of	  these	  firms	  are	  also	  regionally	  concentrated	  around	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  
Morogoro.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  beverages,	  across	  all	  sectors,	  the	  lack	  of	  medium-­‐size	  firms	  
–	  the	  so	  called	  “missing	  middle”	  –	  impedes	  generating	  (and	  distributing)	  value	  along	  the	  
value	  chains,	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  employment	  generation.	  Export	  activities	  are	  even	  more	  
concentrated,	  in	  both	  manufacturing	  and	  mining,	  among	  large	  establishments	  (see	  also	  
Sutton	  and	  Olomi,	  2012).	  
	   	  
	  
1	  Andreoni	  in	  (MITI,	  2016)	  and	  Andreoni	  (2017)	  provide	  a	  complete	  production	  linkages	  analysis	  (PLA)	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	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Figure	  8:	  MVA	  and	  export	  performances	  by	  establishment	  size,	  Tanzania	  2013	  
	   	  
Source:	  Andreoni,	  2017;	  based	  on	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  (Nbs),	  Tanzania	  
Investments	  in	  education	  and,	  more	  critically,	  technical	  skills,	  have	  been	  extremely	  low	  and	  
ineffective	  in	  both	  vocational	  education	  and	  training	  and	  higher	  level	  education,	  leading	  to	  a	  
structural	  shortage	  of	  technicians	  and	  engineers.	  The	  level	  and	  availability	  of	  sector-­‐specific	  
skills	  profile	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  remains	  overwhelmingly	  low,	  although	  foreign	  and	  
Medium	  and	  High	  Tech	  (MHT)	  firms	  have	  implemented	  a	  number	  of	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  training	  
schemes	  (Figure	  9)2.	  More	  skills,	  higher	  levels	  skills	  and	  different	  kinds	  of	  skills	  are	  needed	  to	  
enhance	  Tanzanian	  industrial	  competitiveness.	  While	  the	  supply	  of	  skills	  is	  important,	  the	  
increasing	  demand	  for	  them	  is	  equally	  important.	  Demand	  for	  skills	  comes	  from	  the	  
expansion	  and	  efficient	  utilisation	  of	  the	  existing	  production	  capacity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
attraction	  of	  new	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investments.	  These	  investments	  are	  critical	  to	  
increase	  skilled	  workforce	  productivity	  and	  develop	  organisational	  capabilities	  in	  
manufacturing	  industries	  (Andreoni,	  2014;	  Khan,	  2017).	  
	   	  
	  
2	  Andreoni	  in	  (MITI	  and	  UNIDO,	  2012)	  provides	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  skills	  gaps	  and	  mismatches	  in	  Tanzania,	  based	  on	  a	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Figure	  9:	  Skills	  levels	  of	  workforce	  by	  different	  types	  of	  firms,	  2012	  
	  
Source:	  Andreoni	  in	  (MITI	  and	  UNIDO,	  2012)	  
Tanzania	  has	  managed	  to	  outperform	  its	  regional	  comparators	  and	  other	  benchmark	  
countries	  in	  terms	  of	  investments	  in	  gross	  fixed	  capital	  formation	  (GFCF)	  and	  foreign	  direct	  
investments	  (FDIs)	  (Figure	  10).	  In	  2004	  Tanzania	  was	  reporting	  a	  share	  of	  total	  GFCF	  in	  GDP	  
of	  almost	  25	  percent	  (against	  15	  percent	  in	  Kenya).	  Ten	  years	  later,	  in	  2014,	  Kenya	  managed	  
to	  catch	  up	  and	  reduce	  the	  difference	  to	  less	  than	  5	  percent	  points,	  although	  Tanzania	  is	  still	  
leading	  in	  the	  East	  African	  region	  with	  a	  GFCF	  of	  34	  percent	  as	  share	  of	  GDP.	  Similarly,	  
Tanzania	  is	  leading	  in	  terms	  of	  FDI	  attraction	  with	  net	  inflows	  above	  4	  percent	  as	  share	  of	  
GDP	  (Figure	  10).	  However,	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investments	  have	  been	  mainly	  
concentrated	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  extractive	  sectors,	  where	  they	  are	  attracted	  by	  high	  
level	  rents.	  In	  particular,	  mineral	  rents	  in	  Tanzania	  are	  by	  far	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  region3.	  Since	  
2004,	  the	  mineral	  rents	  have	  remained	  above	  1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  and	  reached	  a	  peak	  in	  2011	  
when	  the	  mineral	  rent	  reached	  5	  percent	  (Figure	  11).	  
	   	  
	  
3	  Mineral	  rents	  are	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  value	  of	  production	  for	  a	  stock	  of	  minerals	  at	  world	  prices	  and	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Figure	  10:	  Domestic	  and	  foreign	  investments	  in	  Tanzania	  as	  share	  of	  GDP,	  2000	  -­‐	  2014	  
	  
	  
Source:	  MITI,	  2016	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Figure	  11:	  Mineral	  rents,	  2000	  -­‐	  2015	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculation	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  share	  of	  manufacturing	  in	  total	  GFCF	  of	  Tanzania	  has	  been	  declining	  from	  
around	  20%	  between	  1995	  and	  2000,	  to	  around	  7%	  or	  8%	  between	  2003	  and	  2010	  (MITI,	  
2016).	  Notably,	  investments	  in	  the	  power	  sector	  have	  remained	  extremely	  low,	  although	  some	  
improvements	  in	  terms	  of	  power	  generation	  were	  reported	  in	  2016	  (Figure	  12).	  	  
Finally,	  even	  when	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investments	  reach	  productive	  sectors	  and	  activities,	  
the	  chronic	  underutilisation	  of	  production	  capacity	  has	  hindered	  opportunities	  for	  scale-­‐led	  
productivity	  increases,	  costs	  reduction	  and,	  thus,	  increased	  price	  competitiveness	  (Table	  2).	  
Production	  scale-­‐up	  remains	  a	  critical	  challenge	  for	  increasing	  productivity	  in	  Tanzania,	  
especially	  among	  smaller	  firms	  (Andreoni,	  2017).	  Many	  of	  them	  have	  shifted	  in	  the	  “wrong”	  
structural	  change	  direction,	  that	  is,	  labour	  has	  moved	  from	  more	  productive	  to	  less	  
productive	  sectors	  (McMillan	  and	  Rodrik,	  2011),	  leading	  to	  de-­‐industrialisation	  and	  
increasing	  informality.	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Figure	  12:	  Power	  generation	  percent	  change	  
	  
Sources:	  Tanzanian	  authorities	  and	  IMF	  staff	  projections	  	  
(IMF,	  January	  2017)	  
Table	  2:	  Production	  capacity	  utilization	  
Product	  description	  




All	  products	  (CPC	  code)	   63%	  
Products	  of	  agriculture,	  horticulture	  etc	   65.3%	  
Dairy	  products	   53.1%	  
Meat,	  fish,	  fruit,	  vegetables,	  oils	  and	  fats	   57.3%	  
Beverages	   63%	  
Textile	  articles	  other	  than	  apparel	   59.6%	  
Basic	  chemicals	   66.7%	  
Basic	  metals	   59.4%	  
Electricity,	  town	  gas,	  steam	  and	  hot	  water	   75%	  
Source:	  Census	  of	  Industrial	  Production,	  Nbs,	  2013	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3. Political	  settlement	  and	  political	  
corruption	  in	  Tanzania	  
Since	  the	  country’s	  independence	  in	  1961,	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  witnessed	  
a	  slow	  process	  of	  transformation,	  characterised	  by	  both	  elements	  of	  change	  and	  persistence.	  
Changes	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  have	  been	  driven	  by	  factional	  conflicts	  within	  the	  ruling	  
coalition,	  CCM	  (Chama	  Cha	  Mapinduzi),	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  party,	  as	  well	  as	  amongst	  
lower	  level	  factions	  constituting	  the	  pyramidal	  organisation	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  These	  
conflicts	  escalated	  in	  three	  critical	  phases	  and	  were	  triggered	  by	  three	  intertwined	  
processes.	  These	  are:	  (i)	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  socialist	  model	  of	  development	  and,	  thus,	  the	  
forced	  privatisation	  and	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s;	  (ii)	  the	  
shift	  to	  a	  multi-­‐party	  regime	  in	  1992	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  excluded	  party	  factions,	  in	  both	  
mainland	  (especially	  urban	  areas)	  and	  Zanzibar	  in	  the	  2000s;	  finally,	  (iii)	  the	  increasing	  
incidence	  of	  corruption	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  grand	  corruption	  scandals	  under	  the	  first	  
and	  second	  Kikwete	  governments,	  from	  2005	  to	  2015.	  	  
With	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  multiparty	  democracy	  in	  1995,	  corruption	  has	  become	  a	  major	  
driver	  of	  change	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement	  and	  has	  resulted	  in	  factional	  conflicts	  
within	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  its	  lower	  level	  factions.	  In	  particular,	  corruption	  has	  played	  a	  
key	  role	  in	  the	  recent	  shift	  to	  the	  current	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  settlement	  under	  
Magufuli,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  most	  recent	  attempts	  to	  transition	  towards	  a	  ‘potential	  
developmental	  coalition’	  settlement.	  In	  the	  following	  sections,	  we	  develop	  a	  political	  
settlement	  analysis	  (PSA)	  of	  Tanzania,	  its	  evolution	  since	  independence	  as	  well	  as	  its	  
potential	  future	  trajectories	  (Box	  1	  provides	  an	  introduction	  to	  political	  settlements	  
analysis).	  Understanding	  the	  deep	  roots	  of	  today’s	  clientelistic	  networks	  and	  the	  complex	  
dynamics	  whereby	  the	  “party	  of	  the	  revolution”	  –	  Chama	  Cha	  Mapinduzi	  (CCM)	  –	  has	  
managed	  to	  institutionalise	  and	  retain	  its	  power	  since	  1961,	  is	  critical	  for	  understanding	  
today’s	  Magufuli	  Presidency	  and	  Tanzania’s	  future	  potential	  trajectories.	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Box	  1:	  The	  Political	  Settlements	  Analysis	  (PSA)	  
The	  distribution	  of	  organizational	  power	  in	  a	  society	  (its	  political	  settlement)	  is	  an	  
important	  determinant	  of	  the	  policies	  and	  institutions	  that	  emerge	  and	  how	  effectively	  
they	  can	  be	  implemented.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  affects	  implementation	  because	  it	  
identifies	  the	  organizations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  capture	  rents,	  if	  necessary	  by	  distorting	  
formal	  policies.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  across	  political	  organizations	  and	  within	  the	  
ruling	  coalition	  are	  both	  important.	  The	  capabilities	  of	  economic	  organizations	  and	  of	  
the	  bureaucracy	  (including	  the	  military)	  are	  also	  important	  components	  of	  the	  overall	  
configuration	  of	  power.	  However,	  the	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  is	  particularly	  
important	  and	  we	  use	  the	  framework	  in	  Khan	  (2010)	  to	  describe	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  as	  shown	  below.	  
	  
The	  configuration	  of	  power	  in	  the	  top	  left	  hand	  corner	  of	  the	  diagram	  describes	  
‘potential	  developmental	  coalitions’	  where	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  faces	  weak	  opposition	  
from	  excluded	  groups	  and	  the	  leadership	  has	  effective	  power	  over	  their	  own	  
organizations.	  This	  combination	  results	  in	  long	  time	  horizons	  as	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  is	  
not	  vulnerable	  and	  significant	  implementation	  capabilities	  as	  its	  lower	  levels	  can	  be	  
disciplined	  by	  higher	  levels.	  These	  coalitions	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  authoritarian	  but	  rarely	  
have	  to	  use	  violence.	  In	  principle	  they	  could	  also	  be	  elected	  to	  power.	  	  
As	  excluded	  organizations	  become	  more	  powerful,	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  to	  use	  
more	  repression	  or	  violence	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  We	  then	  have	  the	  emergence	  of	  
‘vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalitions’	  as	  we	  move	  towards	  the	  top	  right.	  These	  coalitions	  
have	  a	  shorter	  time	  horizon	  and	  the	  leadership	  engages	  in	  more	  unproductive	  rent	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However,	  these	  ruling	  coalitions	  tend	  to	  lose	  control	  over	  lower	  levels	  because	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  control	  lower	  levels	  if	  powerful	  excluded	  organizations	  offer	  them	  better	  deals.	  
Parts	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  can	  begin	  to	  leave	  and	  build	  new	  organizations	  or	  join	  the	  
opposition	  hoping	  to	  get	  better	  deals.	  As	  multiple	  parties	  emerge,	  each	  party	  has	  weaker	  
control	  over	  their	  organization	  because	  disaffected	  members	  can	  leave.	  We	  are	  then	  in	  
the	  bottom	  right	  hand	  corner	  described	  as	  ‘competitive	  clientelism’.	  This	  configuration	  of	  
power	  typically	  supports	  democratic	  competition	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Democracy	  can	  
be	  more	  stable	  and	  less	  repressive	  than	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  if	  
organizational	  power	  has	  actually	  become	  fragmented,	  but	  democratic	  parties	  also	  have	  
short	  time	  horizons	  and	  weak	  implementation	  capacities.	  If	  the	  competing	  parties	  can	  
work	  out	  ‘live	  and	  let	  live’	  arrangements	  of	  replacing	  each	  other	  in	  power,	  institutional	  
and	  policy	  stability	  may	  emerge	  with	  good	  development	  outcomes	  in	  some	  contexts.	  
Finally,	  a	  configuration	  of	  power	  where	  a	  large	  political	  organization	  faces	  limited	  
opposition	  can	  result	  in	  a	  ‘weak	  dominant	  party’	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  hand	  corner.	  Such	  a	  
ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  limited	  implementation	  capability	  because	  by	  including	  almost	  
everyone	  the	  leadership	  pays	  the	  price	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  impose	  discipline	  on	  their	  
own	  organization.	  These	  ideal	  types	  are	  simplifications	  and	  many	  examples	  lie	  on	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  these	  configurations:	  for	  instance	  dominant	  parties	  with	  strong	  
organizations	  can	  be	  close	  to	  being	  developmental	  coalitions,	  developmental	  coalitions	  
that	  face	  growing	  resistance	  can	  become	  vulnerable	  authoritarianisms	  and	  so	  on	  (Khan	  
2010).	  
3.1. The	  Nyerere	  developmental	  state	  and	  the	  deep	  roots	  
of	  clientelistic	  networks	  in	  Tanzania	  (1961-­‐1985)	  
In	  1964	  the	  Acts	  of	  Union	  between	  the	  Republic	  of	  Tanganyika	  (today’s	  mainland	  Tanzania),	  
under	  the	  Presidency	  of	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Zanzibar,	  under	  the	  
Presidency	  of	  Abeid	  Karume,	  established	  the	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania	  (URT).	  The	  
federation	  left	  Zanzibar	  with	  substantial	  political	  autonomy,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  
constituting	  its	  own	  house	  of	  representatives	  and	  electing	  the	  president	  of	  Zanzibar.	  
During	  its	  first	  years	  after	  independence,	  Tanzania’s	  economy	  developed	  along	  the	  
trajectory	  set	  during	  the	  colonial	  period.	  Against	  a	  largely	  agrarian	  society,	  in	  1965	  the	  
industrial	  sector	  was	  small	  and	  dominated	  by	  foreign-­‐owned	  companies	  who	  produced	  
around	  75%	  of	  the	  total	  industrial	  output,	  mainly	  focusing	  on	  agro-­‐processing	  (sugar	  mills)	  
and	  some	  low-­‐tech	  manufacturing	  (textile,	  glass	  bottle	  and	  aluminium).	  The	  remaining	  
industrial	  output	  was	  produced	  by	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  businesses,	  mainly	  traders	  who	  had	  
invested	  in	  some	  low-­‐tech	  manufacturing	  industries.	  	  
Given	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  indigenous	  African	  capitalist	  group,	  the	  father	  of	  the	  nation	  President	  
Julius	  Nyerere	  promoted	  the	  following	  set	  of	  policies:	  (i)	  nationalisation	  of	  large	  segments	  of	  
the	  economy	  (especially	  firms	  owned	  by	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  businesses);	  (ii)	  creation	  of	  new	  
parastatals	  (Arusha	  Declaration	  in	  1967);	  (iii)	  promotion	  of	  industrialisation	  via	  import-­‐
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substitution,	  foreign	  concessional	  financing	  and	  exchange	  rate	  policies	  (Basic	  Industry	  
Strategy	  in	  1975).	  In	  the	  rural	  sector,	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  the	  “villagisation	  programme”	  
led	  to	  the	  re-­‐organisation	  of	  land	  in	  small-­‐size	  farming	  units,	  alongside	  the	  establishment	  of	  
larger	  state-­‐owned	  farms	  (Clark,	  1978;	  Coulson,	  1979	  and	  1982;	  Ponte,	  2002;	  Khan,	  2010).	  In	  
1979	  large-­‐scale	  mining	  activities	  were	  put	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  State	  Mining	  
Corporation	  (STAMECO),	  while	  artisanal-­‐scale	  mining	  was	  regulated.	  At	  the	  centre	  of	  
Nyerere’s	  Ujamaa	  model,	  these	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  strategies	  were	  aimed	  at	  reaching	  
economic	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  and	  redistributing	  the	  economic	  power	  towards	  the	  elimination	  of	  
racial	  imbalances	  (Nyerere,	  1968).	  	  
Despite	  Nyerere’s	  state-­‐led	  model	  of	  development,	  during	  the	  Ujamaa	  period	  a	  significant	  
part	  of	  the	  economy	  remained	  in	  private	  hands	  and	  patron-­‐client	  networks	  started	  to	  
develop.	  The	  Arusha	  Declaration	  prohibited	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  from	  being	  
involved	  in	  “capitalist	  activities”.	  However,	  what	  came	  to	  be	  called	  the	  “Leadership	  Code”	  
could	  not	  impede	  indirect	  forms	  of	  involvement	  in	  businesses,	  thus,	  clientelistic	  networks	  
formed	  spanning	  across	  CCM	  and	  businesses.	  While	  some	  factions	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  saw	  
the	  non-­‐African	  business	  people	  as	  enemies	  of	  Ujamaa,	  within	  other	  factions,	  CCM	  members	  
established	  strong	  relationships	  with	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  businessmen	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  
latter	  were	  even	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  ruling	  party	  (Balachandran,	  1981).	  For	  example,	  after	  
the	  nationalisation	  and	  merger	  of	  five	  private	  milling	  companies	  in	  1967,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
largest	  private	  milling	  company	  in	  Tanzania,	  Jayantilal	  Keshavji	  (Andrew)	  Chande	  became	  the	  
manager	  of	  the	  newly	  created	  National	  Milling	  Corporation.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  
promotion	  of	  a	  number	  of	  joint	  public-­‐private	  ventures	  also	  consolidated	  emerging	  
clientelistic	  networks	  between	  the	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  business	  community	  and	  CCM	  factions.	  
Finally,	  a	  new	  “intermediate	  class”	  group	  of	  managers	  running	  parastatals	  companies	  
gradually	  emerged	  (Gray,	  2013;	  see	  Kalecki,	  1976	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “intermediate	  
regimes”).	  	  
The	  organisational	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition,	  TANU	  Tanganyika	  African	  National	  Union	  
led	  by	  Nyerere,	  became	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  multiple	  groups.	  The	  first	  and	  original	  
one	  was	  constituted	  by	  an	  intermediate	  class	  of	  teachers,	  clerks,	  traders	  and	  smallholder	  
farmers,	  as	  well	  as	  military	  people	  who	  established	  trust	  networks	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  
1970s.	  In	  particular,	  through	  attendance	  at	  the	  same	  schools,	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  in	  1961,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  National	  Service	  in	  1965,	  
networks	  of	  friendship,	  loyalty	  and	  interests	  were	  built.	  Some	  of	  these	  networks	  crystallised	  
later	  in	  party	  factions	  and	  longstanding	  alliances	  within	  CCM	  (Taylor,	  1963;	  Hyden	  and	  
Mmuya,	  2008;	  Therkildsen	  and	  Bourgouin,	  2012).	  Alongside	  this	  traditional	  elite	  network,	  as	  
became	  evident	  in	  the	  privatisation	  era	  of	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  there	  was	  an	  emerging	  
clientelistic	  network	  linking	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  business	  people	  and	  factions	  of	  the	  ruling	  
coalition,	  as	  well	  as	  factions	  of	  CCM	  and	  lower	  level	  factions	  running	  the	  parastatal	  machine.	  
Another	  important	  set	  of	  networks	  emerged	  from	  the	  complex	  relationships	  between	  
Tanzania	  mainland	  and	  Zanzibar.	  Since	  the	  unification,	  political	  tensions	  and	  conflicts	  
between	  political	  factions	  within	  the	  islands,	  as	  well	  as	  across	  dominant	  factions	  in	  the	  
mainland	  and	  Zanzibar,	  culminated	  with	  the	  assassination	  of	  the	  first	  President	  of	  Zanzibar	  
Karume	  in	  1972.	  More	  critically,	  these	  factional	  conflicts	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  and	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consolidation	  of	  new,	  powerful	  networks	  and	  the	  convergence	  of	  interests	  between	  TANU	  
and	  the	  Afro-­‐Shirazi	  Party	  of	  Zanzibar.	  The	  two	  parties	  united	  in	  1977	  to	  create	  the	  Chama	  
Cha	  Mapinduzi	  (CCM).	  
In	  1979,	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  macroeconomic	  crisis	  which	  led	  to	  the	  Structural	  Adjustment	  
Programmes	  during	  the	  Mwinyi	  presidency,	  the	  government	  owned	  380	  highly	  subsidised	  
parastatal	  companies	  operating	  in	  multiple	  sectors.	  Despite	  Nyerere’s	  industrialisation	  
success	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  relatively	  diversified	  manufacturing	  base,	  parastatal	  
companies	  reported	  falling	  rates	  of	  productivity	  and	  chronic	  low	  levels	  of	  production	  
capacity	  utilisation	  (PCU).	  Across	  a	  number	  of	  manufacturing	  industries	  PCU	  was	  only	  30	  
percent,	  while	  in	  the	  textile	  industries	  it	  fell	  even	  lower	  at	  10	  percent	  or	  4	  percent	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  Morogoro	  Shoe	  Company	  (Wangwe,	  1979;	  Temu	  and	  Due,	  1998;	  Clark,	  1978).	  
For	  a	  long	  time	  the	  government	  continued	  expanding	  investments	  in	  production	  capacity	  
despite	  these	  extremely	  poor	  performances.	  As	  a	  result,	  by	  1990	  Tanzania	  had	  developed	  
425	  public	  companies.	  When	  the	  government	  attempted	  to	  implement	  a	  parastatal	  
rationalisation	  programme,	  it	  was	  too	  late:	  the	  weak	  dominant	  party	  was	  unable	  to	  enforce	  
the	  programme.	  The	  overall	  incapacity	  of	  the	  government	  to	  discipline	  costly	  subsidies	  to	  
parastatals	  quickly	  led	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  manufacturing	  output,	  combined	  
with	  a	  critical	  shortage	  of	  inputs	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  limitations.	  In	  turn,	  parastatal	  
managers	  reacted	  by	  colluding	  with	  CCM	  state	  officials	  and	  traders	  and	  engaged	  in	  
corruption	  activities	  and	  racketing	  in	  the	  black	  market	  (Gray,	  2013).	  	  
The	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  CCM	  conflicting	  factions	  and	  their	  clientelistic	  networks	  
became	  evident	  in	  1983,	  when	  Nyerere’s	  closest	  aide	  and	  Prime	  Minister,	  Edward	  Sokoini,	  
launched	  a	  cleaning	  operation	  –	  “Operation	  Economic	  Saboteur”	  –	  which	  led	  to	  the	  
imprisonment	  of	  thousands	  of	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  traders	  and	  shop-­‐keepers	  involved	  in	  these	  
corruption	  activities.	  Given	  the	  targeted	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  these	  imprisonments,	  the	  
operation	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  last	  attempt	  of	  the	  CCM	  faction	  led	  by	  Nyerere	  to	  retain	  control	  
of	  the	  emerging	  factions	  and	  their	  clientelistic	  networks.	  In	  1984	  the	  mysterious	  death	  of	  
Sokoini,	  identified	  by	  many	  as	  Nyerere’s	  heir,	  and	  the	  resignation	  of	  Nyerere	  in	  1985	  closed	  
the	  Ujamaa	  era,	  and	  opened	  a	  new	  era	  of	  privatisation	  and	  economic	  liberalisation.	  
3.2. Privatisation,	  multi-­‐partitism	  and	  corruption:	  the	  
weakening	  of	  the	  dominant	  party	  under	  Mwinyi	  (1985-­‐1995)	  	  
The	  Ali	  Hassan	  Mwinyi	  presidency	  (1985-­‐95)	  represented	  a	  fundamental	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  
reconfiguration	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  clientelistic	  
networks	  involving	  CCM	  factions	  and	  businesses.	  Between	  1987	  and	  1996,	  around	  105	  
parastatal	  were	  making	  profits,	  while	  160	  reported	  losses	  (Cooksey,	  2011).	  In	  1992,	  under	  
the	  Parastatal	  Sector	  Reform	  Programme	  (PPRSP)	  and	  Privatisation	  Masterplan,	  the	  larger	  
and	  relatively	  more	  profitable	  manufacturing	  firms	  and	  the	  state-­‐owned	  mining	  sector	  were	  
sold	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  A	  faction	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  favoured	  the	  development	  of	  a	  FDI-­‐
led	  model	  of	  growth	  for	  large-­‐scale	  manufacturing	  and	  mining	  industry,	  against	  the	  interests	  
of	  smaller	  producers	  and	  artisanal	  miners	  (Therkildsen	  and	  Bourgouin,	  2012).	  In	  1990	  the	  
first	  Investment	  Act,	  followed	  by	  a	  second	  Tanzanian	  Investment	  Act	  in	  1997,	  introduced	  a	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number	  of	  ring-­‐fenced	  incentives	  to	  attract	  and	  reassure	  foreign	  investors.	  Beyond	  FDI	  in	  the	  
mining	  industry,	  however,	  FDIs	  mainly	  went	  to	  revitalise	  existing	  parastatal	  assets,	  in	  
particular	  in	  sectors	  like	  beverages,	  tobacco,	  chemical	  and	  plastics	  (Gray,	  2013).	  
A	  considerable	  number	  of	  smaller	  manufacturing	  firms	  were	  sold	  back	  to	  their	  pre-­‐
nationalisation	  owners.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐connected	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  players	  also	  
managed	  to	  capture	  significant	  segments	  of	  the	  industrial	  sector	  and	  various	  parastatal	  
assets.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  this	  phase,	  a	  num	  ber	  of	  these	  businesses	  men	  started	  a	  significant	  
process	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation	  across	  a	  number	  of	  productive	  and	  trading	  activities.	  In	  
fact,	  many	  of	  the	  emerging	  capitalists	  were	  both	  traders	  and	  producers,	  while	  a	  truly	  
indigenous	  industrial	  class	  was	  still	  missing.	  Finally,	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  former	  parastatal	  
managers	  started	  private	  businesses	  and	  joined	  the	  small	  group	  of	  indigenous	  Tanzanian	  
entrepreneurs.	  	  
However,	  a	  number	  of	  loss-­‐making	  parastatals	  managed	  to	  avoid	  this	  wave	  of	  privatisations	  
and	  continued	  to	  extract	  huge	  rents	  from	  the	  government	  in	  the	  form	  of	  financial	  transfers	  
(in	  1994	  these	  were	  almost	  $360	  million;	  see	  Cooksey,	  2011).	  The	  fact	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Mwinyi	  presidency	  only	  141	  parastatal	  were	  privatised	  tells	  a	  lot	  about	  the	  resistance	  and	  
factional	  conflicts	  that	  privatisation	  caused	  within	  CCM	  and	  their	  increasing	  involvement	  in	  
clientelistic	  networks.	  In	  1991,	  with	  the	  Zanzibar	  Resolution,	  the	  Leadership	  Code	  of	  the	  
Arusha	  Declaration	  was	  abolished,	  and	  CCM	  members	  were	  formally	  allowed	  to	  directly	  
engage	  in	  “capitalist	  activities”.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  number	  of	  businessmen	  joined	  the	  CCM	  party,	  
including	  prominent	  Asian-­‐Tanzanian	  businessmen..	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Zanzibar	  Resolution	  ratified	  
the	  ongoing	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  interdependencies	  between	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  the	  
private	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  within	  CCM.	  The	  more	  traditional	  CCM	  faction	  backing	  the	  Ujamaa	  
domestic-­‐led	  model	  of	  development	  was	  defeated,	  while	  the	  one	  supporting	  foreign	  
businesses	  and	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  businesses	  managed	  to	  advance.	  
The	  weakening	  and	  fragmentation	  of	  CCM	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  was	  also	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  
escalation	  of	  three	  major	  events,	  and	  the	  related	  rise	  of	  new	  tensions	  and	  power	  conflicts	  in	  
the	  political	  settlement.	  	  
First,	  in	  1992	  the	  transition	  towards	  a	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  opened	  the	  possibility	  of	  
democratic	  elections,	  but	  also	  caused	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  apparatus	  and	  
electoral	  process.	  The	  national	  security	  and	  intelligence	  services	  were	  formally	  distanced	  
from	  the	  CCM,	  and	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Presidency.	  CCM,	  however,	  
created	  a	  powerful	  internal	  National	  Security	  and	  Ethics	  Committee,	  which	  has	  played	  a	  key	  
role	  in	  the	  presidential	  elections	  since	  then.	  Secondly,	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  Elections	  Act	  in	  
1995	  (Section	  97[4])	  whereby	  MPs	  were	  allowed	  to	  make	  financial	  contributions	  to	  
community	  development	  (provided	  that	  these	  contributions	  were	  done	  “before”	  the	  
campaign	  period),	  intensified	  the	  building	  up	  of	  clientelistic	  networks	  centred	  on	  CCM	  
politicians.	  From	  the	  CCM	  candidate’s	  perspective,	  engagement	  with	  powerful	  organisations	  
became	  necessary	  for	  raising	  policy	  money	  for	  electoral	  campaigns.	  Powerful	  organisations,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  reinforce	  their	  networks	  and	  infiltrate	  the	  political	  
process,	  whereby	  rents	  could	  be	  captured.	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Second,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Tanzania	  mainland	  and	  Zanzibar	  also	  became	  increasingly	  
problematic.	  In	  1993	  a	  CCM	  faction	  composed	  of	  55	  MPs	  –	  the	  so	  called	  G55	  –	  asked	  for	  a	  
constitutional	  amendment	  entailing	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  government	  of	  Tanganyika	  and	  the	  
possibility	  for	  the	  islands	  to	  join	  the	  Organisation	  of	  Islamic	  Conference	  (OIC).	  This	  proposal	  
threatened	  the	  two-­‐tier	  Union	  structure	  and	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  The	  
presence	  of	  a	  Zanzibari	  faction	  within	  CCM	  re-­‐emerged	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  In	  1995,	  with	  
the	  shift	  to	  multi-­‐party	  politics,	  the	  newly	  constituted	  opposition	  party	  –	  the	  Civic	  United	  
Front	  (CUF)	  –	  managed	  to	  win	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  Zanzibar,	  and	  thus	  effectively	  
challenged	  the	  constituted	  government.	  Since	  this	  first	  election,	  the	  CUF	  electoral	  base	  has	  
been	  mainly	  composed	  by	  Muslim	  voters,	  with	  a	  strong	  Zanzibari	  identity.	  	  
Third,	  in	  early	  1995,	  just	  before	  the	  first	  multi-­‐party	  election	  in	  Tanzania’s	  history,	  a	  major	  
corruption	  scandal	  shocked	  the	  CCM	  party	  (Heilman	  and	  Ndumbaro,	  2002).	  The	  Minister	  of	  
Home	  Affairs,	  Augustine	  Mrema,	  accused	  President	  Mwinyi	  of	  not	  having	  taken	  any	  steps	  
against	  a	  major	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  business	  men	  accused	  of	  selling	  food	  unfit	  for	  consumption.	  
Mrema	  abandoned	  CCM	  and	  joined	  the	  political	  opposition	  NCCR-­‐Mageuzi,	  to	  run	  as	  their	  
presidential	  candidate	  for	  the	  election	  in	  October	  1995.	  Mrema	  brought	  corruption	  to	  the	  
centre	  of	  the	  first	  multi-­‐party	  electoral	  campaign	  in	  Tanzania.	  In	  fact,	  corruption	  accusations	  
against	  Asian	  business	  people	  had	  been	  popularised	  by	  the	  charismatic	  reverend	  Christopher	  
Mtikila	  since	  1993.	  Mtikila	  openly	  accused	  the	  government	  of	  allowing	  rich	  Asians	  to	  capture	  
resources	  at	  the	  expenses	  of	  dispossessed	  Africans	  (walalahoi).	  He	  also	  denounced	  the	  
existence	  of	  181	  magabacholi	  (wealthy	  non-­‐Tanganyikans)	  who,	  according	  to	  him,	  had	  taken	  
control	  of	  the	  country.	  These	  accusations	  were	  clearly	  directed	  to	  those	  clientelistic	  
networks	  linking	  CCM	  factions	  to	  a	  number	  of	  businessmen	  since	  the	  Ujamaa	  period,	  and	  
then	  in	  the	  privatisation	  phase	  (Heilman,	  1998;	  Heilman	  and	  Ndumbaro,	  2002;	  Brennan,	  
2012).	  
In	  March	  1995	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  fragmented	  CCM	  and,	  thus,	  the	  fear	  of	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  
‘weak	  dominant	  party	  settlement’	  towards	  a	  ‘competitive	  clientelistic	  settlement’,	  forced	  
the	  last	  political	  act	  of	  the	  retired,	  but	  still	  influential,	  President	  Nyerere.	  He	  famously	  
accused	  the	  ruling	  party	  CCM	  of	  having	  lost	  control	  of	  corruption,	  and	  said	  that	  the	  country	  
“reeked	  of	  corruption”	  (Heilman	  and	  Ndumbaro,	  2002).	  Nyerere	  openly	  denounced	  the	  
rampant,	  state-­‐constraining	  corruption	  and	  political	  corruption,	  involving	  both	  parastatals	  
and	  private	  companies	  in	  multiple	  activities,	  such	  as	  tax	  evasions	  on	  imports	  and	  losses	  
related	  to	  counterpart	  funds	  accounting	  for	  $557	  million	  (Hodd	  and	  Theobald,	  1996).	  	  
During	  the	  CCM	  primaries	  in	  1995,	  Nyerere	  vetoed	  the	  nomination	  of	  Edward	  Lowassa,	  given	  
his	  business	  interests	  and	  networks.	  Nyerere	  also	  managed	  to	  impose	  a	  relatively	  unknown	  
candidate,	  Benjamin	  Mkapa,	  with	  a	  reputation	  for	  integrity	  (“Mr	  Clean”).	  The	  other	  
shortlisted	  candidate	  was	  Jakaya	  Kikwete,	  who	  was	  allegedly	  asked	  to	  wait	  his	  turn	  in	  the	  
2005	  presidential	  election	  (TEMCO,	  1997).	  Kikwete	  came	  from	  military	  service,	  and	  worked	  
as	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  under	  Mkapa	  until	  2005,	  when	  he	  was	  elected	  president.	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3.3. The	  Mkapa	  reforms	  and	  the	  response	  to	  corruption	  of	  
a	  weak	  dominant	  party	  (1995-­‐2005)	  
Mkapa’s	  presidency	  repositioned	  the	  CCM	  ruling	  coalition	  within	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  
settlement.	  His	  presidency	  managed	  to	  consolidate	  the	  holding	  power	  of	  the	  weak	  dominant	  
party	  and	  attempted,	  with	  some	  success,	  to	  address	  corruption	  while	  limiting	  the	  increasing	  
power	  of	  the	  lower	  factions	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  During	  this	  presidency,	  there	  were	  two	  
main	  areas	  of	  intervention:	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  pro-­‐market	  reforms,	  especially	  privatisation.	  	  
Following	  on	  from	  his	  electoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign,	  on	  January	  1996	  Mkapa	  
established	  the	  Presidential	  Commission	  on	  Corruption	  chaired	  by	  the	  former	  prime	  minister	  
(under	  the	  first	  Mwinyi	  government),	  Joseph	  Warioba.	  The	  Warioba	  Report	  was	  particularly	  
influential:	  it	  led	  to	  the	  retirement	  of	  20	  upper-­‐level	  state	  officials	  in	  the	  “public	  interest”	  
and	  allowed	  for	  an	  open	  debate	  on	  corruption	  in	  the	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  (see	  also	  section	  
4).	  In	  response	  to	  the	  poor	  performance	  of	  the	  Tanzania	  Revenue	  Authority	  (TRA),	  Mkapa	  
introduced	  a	  number	  of	  tax	  reforms	  and	  intensified	  tax	  collection.	  A	  number	  of	  corrupted	  
staff	  members	  of	  TRA	  were	  dismissed	  while	  a	  number	  of	  reforms	  in	  public	  financial	  
management	  (e.g.	  budgeting	  system)	  and	  public	  procurement	  (Public	  Procurement	  Act,	  
2002)	  were	  introduced	  to	  fight	  bureaucratic	  corruption.	  These	  steps	  managed	  to	  achieve	  
some	  success	  (Gray,	  2015).	  	  
While	  these	  reforms	  contributed	  to	  institutionalising	  greater	  transparency	  and	  
accountability	  mechanisms,	  the	  legalisation	  of	  the	  widespread	  takrima	  (meaning	  
“hospitality”)	  practice	  in	  April	  2000	  (six	  months	  before	  the	  presidential	  election)	  favoured	  
the	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  political	  money:	  that	  is,	  the	  need	  to	  spend	  significant	  resources	  to	  
buy	  large	  consensus	  during	  campaign	  periods.	  The	  latter	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “harvesting	  
season”	  for	  “exchanging	  votes	  for	  gifts	  of	  money,	  meals,	  and	  party	  apparel	  referred	  to	  
colloquially	  as	  food,	  sofa,	  sugar,	  or	  tea”	  (Philips,	  2010:	  123).	  The	  legalisation	  of	  takrima	  was	  
motivated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  different	  from	  corruption	  and	  that,	  in	  fact,	  it	  was	  
widespread	  and	  almost	  necessary	  within	  the	  new	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  regime.	  Given	  the	  
strong	  clientelistic	  networks	  linking	  CCM	  factions	  to	  various	  powerful	  organisations	  in	  the	  
private	  sector,	  this	  reform	  favoured	  CCM	  against	  the	  oppositions,	  while	  inducing	  even	  more	  
rents	  capture	  conflicts	  between	  different	  CCM	  factions,	  especially	  during	  the	  CCM	  
presidential	  primaries	  and	  the	  national	  electoral	  campaign.	  
In	  terms	  of	  economic	  policies,	  Mkapa	  attempted	  to	  complete	  the	  long	  transition	  to	  a	  market	  
economy	  started	  with	  Mwinyi,	  while	  responding	  to	  the	  mounting	  pressure	  of	  various	  
internal	  factions.	  In	  1996	  Mkapa	  launched	  a	  long-­‐term	  Sustainable	  Industries	  Development	  
Policy	  1996-­‐2020	  and	  a	  new	  Tanzanian	  Investment	  Act	  in	  1997,	  to	  encourage	  both	  domestic	  
and	  foreign	  investments.	  Privatisation	  received	  a	  substantial	  acceleration:	  between	  1995	  
and	  2004,	  219	  parastatal	  were	  privatised.	  Mkapa	  also	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  
constraining	  private	  and	  foreign	  investments,	  including	  problems	  related	  to	  import	  
clearance,	  trade	  licensing,	  expatriate	  work	  permits,	  land	  acquisition,	  planning	  approval	  and	  
the	  complex	  and	  ambiguous	  system	  of	  taxes.	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By	  1996,	  the	  first	  positive	  signs	  of	  manufacturing	  recovery	  were	  registered.	  However,	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  ongoing	  redistribution	  of	  organisational	  power	  within	  CCM	  and,	  in	  particular,	  as	  
a	  response	  to	  Mkapa’s	  house-­‐cleaning	  initiatives,	  privatisation	  of	  key	  assets	  such	  as	  
TANESCO	  and	  austerity	  policies,	  a	  number	  of	  CCM	  factions	  started	  challenging	  the	  
government.	  On	  various	  occasions,	  the	  parliament	  witnessed	  open	  factional	  conflicts	  and	  
acts	  of	  revenge.	  Emerging	  factions	  connected	  to	  different	  clientelistic	  networks	  –	  sometimes	  
religiously	  or	  geographically	  defined	  –	  stood	  against	  the	  government	  and	  hinted	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  new	  CCM	  political	  faces	  were	  as	  corrupt	  as	  the	  old	  ones.	  One	  of	  these	  emerging	  
lower	  level	  factions	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  “Southern	  bloc”,	  others	  included	  a	  bloc	  centred	  
around	  the	  “Lake	  Zone”	  and,	  finally,	  the	  “G46	  group”	  composed	  of	  both	  Southern	  Highlands	  
and	  Lake	  Zone	  MPs	  calling	  for	  economic	  policies	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  “common	  man”	  
(Kelsall,	  2003).	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  economic	  empowerment	  of	  the	  “wazawa”	  –	  locally	  born	  –	  was	  also	  raised	  
again	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  Mkapa	  government,	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Industry	  and	  Trade,	  Iddi	  
Simba.	  In	  his	  proposal,	  30	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  sectors	  should	  have	  been	  given	  
exclusively	  to	  wazawa,	  while	  for	  other	  sectors	  a	  peer	  joint	  venture	  model	  favouring	  the	  
involvement	  of	  Africans	  in	  industrial	  businesses	  should	  have	  been	  enforced.	  This	  position	  
was	  seen	  by	  the	  emerging	  dominant	  faction	  within	  CCM,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  foreign	  investors,	  
as	  a	  return	  to	  the	  past,	  and,	  was	  strongly	  rejected.	  Within	  CCM	  the	  rising	  tensions	  and	  
contradictions	  concerning	  businesses	  control	  are	  well	  elucidated	  by	  the	  CCM	  electoral	  
manifesto	  of	  2000.	  Alongside	  endorsing	  privatisation	  and	  its	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  
Tanzanian	  economy,	  the	  manifesto	  also	  argued	  for	  economic	  empowerment	  through	  
cooperatives	  and	  “favouritism	  towards	  nationals	  in	  employment	  and	  commerce”	  (Cooksey,	  
2011;	  italics	  added).	  With	  these	  “favouritisms”	  the	  CCM	  dominant	  faction	  at	  that	  time	  
attempted	  to	  rebuild	  its	  organisational	  power,	  by	  reaching	  out	  to	  intermediate	  classes	  of	  
business	  people,	  many	  of	  them	  involved	  in	  trading	  activities.	  	  
Despite	  its	  internal	  factional	  conflicts,	  during	  the	  Mpaka	  presidency,	  the	  CCM	  ruling	  coalition	  
was	  able	  to	  retain	  centralised	  power	  and	  guarantee	  a	  form	  of	  stability	  under	  a	  weak	  
dominant	  party	  settlement.	  The	  persistence	  of	  this	  regime	  was	  due	  to	  multiple	  factors,	  
involving	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  The	  institutionalisation	  of	  political	  power	  built	  
around	  the	  diffused	  CCM	  party	  apparatus,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relatively	  balanced	  distribution	  of	  
power	  among	  CCM	  factions,	  including	  the	  army	  and	  the	  bureaucracy,	  were	  key	  factors	  of	  
persistence	  (Khan	  and	  Gray,	  2006;	  Lindemann	  and	  Putzel,	  2008).	  In	  particular,	  since	  1992,	  
the	  national	  security	  and	  intelligence	  services	  have	  backed	  up	  the	  “institution	  of	  the	  
presidency”,	  while	  the	  newly	  created	  National	  Security	  and	  Ethics	  Committee	  within	  CCM	  
has	  acquired	  a	  strong	  role,	  especially	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  CCM	  presidential	  candidates.	  The	  
broad	  distribution	  of	  rents	  among	  different,	  although	  sometimes	  overlapping	  and	  fluid	  
clientelistic	  networks	  involving	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  businesses,	  also	  guaranteed	  the	  
persistence	  of	  a	  weak	  dominant	  party	  settlement	  under	  the	  CCM	  ruling	  coalition.	  Many	  
African	  and	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  businesses	  could	  find	  their	  “good	  fathers”	  in	  the	  CCM	  and	  have	  
their	  interests	  and	  rents	  capture	  activities	  protected.	  In	  return,	  they	  would	  support	  the	  CCM	  
party	  and	  election	  machine.	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The	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  the	  elite	  bargaining	  in	  Tanzania	  suggested	  in	  Khan	  and	  Gray	  (2006)	  and	  
Lindermann	  and	  Putzel	  (2008)	  and,	  thus,	  the	  relative	  balance	  amongst	  CCM	  factions,	  gave	  the	  
Mkapa	  presidency	  the	  semblance	  of	  a	  weak	  dominant	  party	  settlement.	  However,	  after	  2005	  
the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement	  shifted	  increasingly	  towards	  a	  ‘competitive	  clientelistic	  
settlement’.	  Two	  main	  factors	  were	  responsible	  for	  that.	  First,	  the	  consolidation	  of	  excluded	  
factions	  outside	  the	  ruling	  coalition,	  in	  particular	  CHADEMA	  in	  mainland,	  and	  the	  Civic	  United	  
Front	  (CUF)	  in	  Zanzibar.	  In	  the	  2000	  elections,	  the	  tensions	  between	  mainland	  and	  Zanzibar	  
escalated	  and	  transformed	  the	  election	  in	  a	  violent	  conflict	  with	  around	  40	  deaths	  (Green,	  
2011).	  Second,	  the	  increasing	  recurrence	  to	  political	  money	  to	  finance	  the	  CCM	  presidential	  
candidate	  selection	  process	  (presidential	  primaries)	  and	  the	  presidential	  national	  campaign.	  
These	  two	  factors	  led	  Tanzania	  towards	  a	  competitive	  clientelistic	  political	  settlement,	  where	  
competing	  factions	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  had	  to	  raise	  increasing	  
amounts	  of	  political	  money	  to	  finance	  their	  run	  for	  the	  presidential	  election.	  
3.4. Grand	  corruption	  and	  competitive	  clientelism	  under	  
Kikwete	  (2005-­‐2015)	  
In	  the	  build	  up	  to	  the	  2005	  presidential	  candidate	  primaries	  and	  national	  campaign,	  CCM	  
candidates	  and	  factions	  increasingly	  engaged	  in	  politically	  motivated	  rent-­‐seeking.	  
Circumstantial	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  External	  Payments	  Accounts	  (EPA)	  scandals	  at	  the	  
Bank	  of	  Tanzania	  were	  in	  fact	  related	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  2005	  campaign	  
(see	  section	  4).	  As	  suggested	  in	  Cooksey	  (2011),	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  business	  interests	  
backed	  all	  three	  final	  presidential	  candidates,	  namely	  Jakaya	  Kikwete,	  Salim	  Ahmed	  Salim	  
and	  Mark	  Mwandosya.	  During	  the	  campaign,	  CCM	  Chief	  Executive	  Philip	  Magula	  reported	  
that	  the	  favoured	  candidate,	  Kikwete,	  and	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  John	  Malecela	  made	  
excessive	  use	  of	  money	  in	  their	  campaigns,	  and	  that	  Kikwete	  could	  have	  been	  disqualified	  as	  
CCM	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  that	  reason.	  Edward	  Lowassa	  was	  part	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  
CCM	  people	  and	  businessmen,	  who	  financially	  supported	  Kikwete	  during	  his	  electoral	  
campaigns	  (Cooksey,	  2011).	  In	  2005	  Kikwete	  was	  elected	  President	  with	  the	  highest	  margin	  
of	  victory	  in	  Tanzanian	  presidential	  elections,	  68	  percent.	  
During	  the	  first	  Kikwete	  government,	  the	  powerful	  and	  well	  connected	  Prime	  Minister	  
Edward	  Lowassa	  consolidated	  his	  influence	  within	  CCM	  by	  securing	  a	  number	  of	  key	  
appointments,	  and	  gaining	  the	  support	  of	  a	  number	  of	  ruling	  party	  MPs	  as	  well	  as	  Regional	  
and	  District	  Commissioners.	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  powerful	  pro-­‐Lowassa	  faction	  of	  the	  ruling	  
coalition,	  with	  a	  strong	  pyramidal	  structure,	  well	  organised	  at	  both	  the	  centre	  and	  district	  
levels,	  led	  to	  an	  open	  conflict	  with	  the	  excluded	  factions	  within	  CCM.	  	  
The	  local	  party	  branches	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  district	  levels	  are	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  CCM	  
machinery,	  which	  an	  aspiring	  presidential	  nominee	  must	  control	  to	  win	  the	  CCM	  primaries.	  A	  
ramified	  and	  complex	  network	  of	  neighbourhood	  representatives	  influences	  political	  views	  
at	  the	  grass-­‐roots	  level,	  and	  exercises	  control	  over	  potential	  dissent	  within	  CCM,	  especially	  
during	  the	  nomination	  of	  delegates	  for	  the	  National	  Congress.	  At	  the	  lowest	  level,	  CCM	  is	  
represented	  by	  so	  called	  ‘cell	  leaders,’	  representing	  ten	  houses.	  This	  gives	  CCM	  an	  
unmatched	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  organisation	  in	  each	  village,	  ward,	  district	  and	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regional	  levels.	  Croke	  (2017),	  for	  example,	  found	  evidence	  of	  citizens	  self-­‐censoring	  in	  the	  
presence	  of	  “party	  agents”	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  latter	  in	  distributing	  rents	  at	  the	  lower	  levels	  
of	  the	  pyramidal	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  	  
At	  the	  centre	  level,	  Lowassa’s	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  parliamentary	  discussions	  around	  
‘sensitive’	  issues	  involving	  its	  clientelistic	  networks,	  compacted	  the	  conflicting	  faction	  within	  
CCM	  around	  Kikwete	  (Cooksey,	  2011).	  This	  unprecedented	  fracture	  within	  CCM,	  and	  the	  
related	  increasing	  need	  to	  raise	  resources	  to	  run	  presidential	  campaigns,	  is	  the	  background	  
against	  which	  the	  corruption	  scandals	  of	  the	  late	  2000s	  developed	  (see	  section	  4).	  In	  April	  
2006,	  only	  four	  months	  after	  the	  election,	  Tanzania’s	  High	  Court	  declared	  that	  the	  
amendment	  of	  the	  Elections	  Act	  passed	  in	  2000,	  which	  legalised	  takrima,	  was	  
unconstitutional	  as	  it	  induced	  legalised	  corruption	  and	  penalised	  lower-­‐income	  candidates.	  
Despite	  that,	  the	  use	  of	  takrima	  continued	  in	  the	  2010	  elections.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  a	  
REPOA	  survey	  conducted	  in	  2012,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  voters	  reported	  increasing	  vote-­‐
buying	  activities	  by	  politicians	  (Tsubura,	  2015).	  This	  led	  the	  pro-­‐Kikwete	  faction	  to	  change	  
CCM	  nomination	  rules	  just	  before	  the	  2010	  elections.	  By	  giving	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  to	  all	  party	  
members,	  CCM	  made	  it	  more	  expensive	  to	  buy	  votes.	  As	  a	  response,	  Yusuf	  Makamba	  
removed	  the	  identity	  card	  control	  requirement	  in	  the	  presidential	  primaries,	  opening	  the	  
process	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  counterfeit	  membership	  cards	  
(Therkildsen	  and	  Bourgouin,	  2012).	  
In	  February	  2008,	  with	  the	  mounting	  Richmond	  energy	  deal	  corruption	  scandal	  (see	  section	  
4),	  Lowassa	  was	  forced	  to	  resign.	  The	  new	  Prime	  Minister	  Mizengo	  Pinda	  formed	  a	  relatively	  
smaller	  government	  with	  only	  26	  ministers	  and	  21	  deputy	  ministers.	  Moreover,	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  break	  some	  of	  the	  clientelistic	  networks	  underpinning	  the	  pro-­‐Lowassa	  faction,	  in	  
2009	  Kikwete	  tried	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  separation	  between	  business	  and	  politics.	  In	  order	  to	  
address	  the	  conflict	  of	  interests	  of	  a	  number	  of	  CCM	  politicians,	  Kikwete	  proposed	  that	  
politicians	  with	  business	  interests	  should	  renounce	  the	  running	  of	  their	  businesses	  and	  these	  
should	  be	  managed	  by	  a	  trust	  for	  the	  time	  they	  were	  in	  political	  office	  (REDET,	  2010).	  This	  
proposal	  raised	  further	  fragmentation	  and	  conflicts	  between	  the	  so	  called	  CCM-­‐Safi	  (clean)	  
and	  the	  CCM-­‐Mafisadi	  (corrupted)	  factions	  (Gray,	  2015).	  	  
This	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  a	  corruption	  scandal	  had	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  fragmentation	  within	  
CCM:	  the	  same	  happened	  in	  1994	  before	  the	  election	  of	  Mkapa	  (see	  section	  3.2).	  However,	  
while	  in	  the	  1990s	  the	  excluded	  factions	  in	  the	  first	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  were	  not	  a	  threat,	  
since	  2010	  the	  excluded	  factions	  clustered	  around	  CHADEMA	  and	  their	  anti-­‐corruption	  
political	  cartel	  had	  grown	  significantly.	  In	  2010	  CCM	  won	  258	  of	  the	  343	  seats	  in	  the	  
parliament	  and	  63	  percent	  of	  votes	  in	  the	  presidential	  election	  which	  led	  to	  the	  
reconfirmation	  of	  Kikwete	  (in	  2005	  Kikwete	  had	  obtained	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  popular	  vote).	  In	  
2010,	  the	  worst	  electoral	  result	  since	  2000	  (Mkapa	  reached	  70	  percent	  in	  2000)	  showed	  the	  
weakness	  of	  the	  CCM	  ruling	  coalition,	  and	  the	  complete	  transition	  of	  Tanzania	  to	  a	  
clientelistic	  competitive	  settlement.	  In	  particular,	  in	  the	  2010	  election	  in	  Mainland	  Tanzania,	  
CHADEMA	  performed	  better	  than	  CCM	  in	  the	  urban	  constituencies	  and	  in	  the	  regions	  
around	  Lake	  Victoria	  and	  Kilimanjaro.	  Similarly,	  the	  excluded	  factions	  in	  Zanzibar	  organised	  
around	  CUF,	  exploited	  the	  increasing	  weakness	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  to	  put	  more	  pressure	  
on	  the	  Union	  government.	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The	  personal	  conflict	  between	  Kikwete	  and	  the	  still	  powerful	  Lowassa	  increased	  the	  
fragmentation	  at	  the	  inter-­‐ministerial	  level,	  and	  weakened	  the	  overall	  capacity	  of	  the	  second	  
Kikwete	  government.	  In	  particular,	  it	  hampered	  its	  capacity	  to	  address	  the	  corruption	  
scandals	  and	  the	  longstanding	  socio-­‐economics	  problems	  in	  both	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  In	  
April	  2011	  factional	  conflicts	  led	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  outcome.	  The	  Central	  Committee	  
(including	  the	  Secretary	  General	  Yusuf	  Makamba)	  resigned	  and	  asked	  the	  party	  chairman	  
Kikwete	  to	  nominate	  a	  new	  team	  to	  achieve	  “a	  real	  transformation	  of	  the	  party,	  to	  rectify	  its	  
low	  morale	  and	  discipline”.	  Kikwete,	  often	  depicted	  by	  some	  as	  a	  weak	  president,	  responded	  
to	  this	  call	  by	  removing	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  (CC)	  powerful	  MPs	  controlling	  major	  
businesses.	  Traditionally,	  the	  CC	  has	  included	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  people	  with	  
military/intelligence	  background.	  In	  2010,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  at	  least	  20%	  of	  the	  CC	  
members	  had	  a	  military	  background,	  including	  President	  and	  Party	  Chairman	  Kikwete	  and	  
the	  Prime	  Minister	  Mizengo	  Pinda	  (Lindeman	  and	  Putzel,	  2008;	  Therkildsen	  and	  Bourgouin,	  
2012).	  In	  2012	  the	  veteran	  CCM	  politician	  Philip	  Mangula	  became	  vice	  Chairman	  of	  CCM,	  
and	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  CCM	  security	  and	  ethics	  committee	  in	  charge	  of	  scrutinising	  
presidential	  candidates	  in	  2015.	  
Despite	  these	  measures,	  the	  CCM	  was	  shaken	  by	  another	  multimillion-­‐dollar	  corruption	  
scandal	  in	  2014	  –	  the	  Tegeta	  Escrow	  Account	  scandal	  –	  which	  led	  to	  the	  forced	  resignation	  of	  
the	  Attorney	  General	  Frederik	  Werema	  (see	  section	  4).	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  main	  
opposition	  parties	  united	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  UKAWA,	  the	  Coalition	  of	  the	  People’s	  
Constitution.	  This	  was	  the	  response	  of	  the	  excluded	  factions	  to	  the	  CCM’s	  attempts	  to	  hijack	  
the	  constitutional	  reform	  process,	  which	  could	  have	  eroded	  the	  dominant	  party’s	  power.	  
The	  grand	  corruption	  scandals,	  combined	  with	  the	  fragmentation	  within	  the	  CCM,	  and	  the	  
emerging	  pressure	  from	  external	  factions	  represented	  a	  key	  threat	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  
ruling	  coalition.	  As	  had	  already	  happened	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  elite	  of	  the	  CCM	  in	  the	  Central	  
Committee	  (CC)	  responded	  to	  this	  threat	  with	  the	  nomination	  of	  a	  relatively	  unexpected	  
presidential	  candidate,	  Joseph	  Pombe	  Magufuli.	  The	  new	  President	  had	  been	  Minister	  of	  
Works	  under	  both	  Mkapa	  (2000-­‐2005)	  and	  Kikwete	  (2005-­‐15),	  and	  arrived	  at	  the	  election	  
with	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  hard-­‐worker,	  effective,	  righteous	  and	  unflashy	  politician.	  
Lowassa	  had	  prepared	  his	  campaign	  for	  the	  presidential	  election	  since	  2005.	  In	  2014	  he	  
faced	  a	  one-­‐year	  ban	  from	  CCM	  after	  he	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  started	  his	  presidential	  
campaign	  ahead	  of	  the	  authorised	  time.	  Despite	  various	  other	  attempts	  to	  block	  him,	  in	  May	  
2015	  Lowassa	  launched	  his	  presidential	  primaries	  campaign	  from	  Arusha.	  However,	  it	  is	  
believed	  that	  the	  deteriorating	  relationship	  between	  Kikwete	  and	  Lowassa	  opened	  the	  space	  
for	  a	  new	  consensus	  between	  the	  more	  traditional	  CCM	  faction	  around	  the	  still	  influential	  
former	  president	  Mkapa..	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  two	  former	  presidents	  Mkapa	  and	  Kikwete	  
converged	  around	  the	  name	  of	  Magufuli	  as	  a	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  split	  of	  the	  party	  and	  the	  loss	  
of	  the	  elections	  with	  Lowassa	  as	  presidential	  candidate.	  For	  the	  second	  time,	  the	  CC	  rejected	  
the	  powerful	  Lowassa	  from	  the	  list	  of	  CCM	  national	  candidates	  (as	  discussed	  above,	  Nyerere	  
strongly	  opposed	  Lowassa’s	  nomination	  in	  1995,	  when	  Mkapa	  and	  Kikwete	  were	  
shortlisted).	  	  
Until	  the	  2015	  election	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  had	  been	  strong	  enough	  to	  keep	  the	  conflicting	  
factions	  together,	  but	  too	  weak	  to	  discipline	  them	  (and	  their	  clientelistic	  networks).	  This	  was	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the	  main	  paradox	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement	  (Khan	  and	  Gray,	  2006).	  However,	  in	  
the	  new	  competitive	  clientelistic	  settlement,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  internal	  factional	  conflicts	  
led	  to	  a	  separation	  and	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  party	  by	  one	  of	  its	  more	  powerful	  
members.	  Lowassa	  left	  CCM	  in	  July	  2015	  and	  ran	  as	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  the	  opposition	  
coalition	  UKAWA,	  including	  CHADEMA.	  A	  number	  of	  CCM	  politicians	  followed	  him	  (although	  
some	  of	  these	  returned	  to	  CCM	  after	  the	  elections),	  including	  the	  party’s	  ideological	  guru	  
Kingunge	  Ngombale-­‐Mwiru,	  and	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  (1995-­‐2005)	  Frederick	  Sumaye.	  
On	  the	  opposition	  camp,	  Lowassa’s	  move	  led	  to	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  secretary	  general	  of	  
CHADEMA	  Peter	  Wilbrod	  Slaa.	  He	  had	  been	  the	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  the	  opposition	  in	  
2010	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  voices	  against	  Lowassa	  and	  his	  alleged	  role	  in	  the	  grand	  
corruption	  scandals.	  	  
In	  the	  presidential	  race,	  Magufuli	  won	  58.5	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  the	  lowest	  consensus	  for	  a	  
CCM	  presidential	  candidate	  since	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  in	  1995.	  Magufuli	  centred	  his	  
presidential	  electoral	  campaign	  on	  five	  main	  related	  themes:	  corruption	  control,	  tax	  
compliance,	  government	  efficiency,	  industrialisation	  and	  free	  education	  policy.	  Lowassa	  
obtained	  the	  remaining	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  votes	  with	  CHADEMA,	  with	  a	  programme	  focused	  
on	  education,	  poverty,	  economic	  growth	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  (Paget,	  2017).	  The	  
parliamentary	  contest	  was	  also	  a	  close	  call,	  with	  CCM	  gaining	  only	  44	  percent.	  However,	  he	  
division	  in	  the	  opposition	  camp,	  allowed	  CCM	  to	  obtain	  the	  large	  part	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  
parliamentary	  election	  (55	  percent,	  189	  seats)	  (Tanzanian	  	  Affairs,	  2016,	  see	  Figure	  10).	  
Figure	  13:	  Tanzania	  regional	  map	  and	  electoral	  results	  by	  regions	  and	  districts,	  National	  
Election	  2015	  
	   	  
Source:	  Tanzania	  Affairs,	  Jan	  1,	  Issue	  113.	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CHADEMA	  gained	  11	  seats	  from	  2010	  (31.8	  percent,	  34	  seats)	  and	  the	  CUF	  gained	  8	  seats	  
from	  2010	  (8.6	  percent,	  32	  seats).	  These	  numbers	  do	  not	  include	  the	  110	  special	  seats	  
(women)	  and	  MPs	  nominated	  by	  the	  President	  for	  a	  total	  of	  370	  MPs.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  
more	  constituencies	  were	  contested.	  “The	  opposition	  exceeded	  expectations	  in	  Dar	  es	  
Salaam,	  where	  its	  MPs	  now	  outnumber	  those	  from	  CCM.	  CHADEMA	  retained	  its	  seats	  in	  
Ubongo	  and	  Kawe,	  won	  the	  new	  constituency	  of	  Kibamba,	  and	  took	  Ukonga	  from	  CCM.	  CUF	  
candidates	  ousted	  CCM	  incumbents	  in	  Kinondoni	  and	  Temeke.	  CCM	  won	  only	  four	  of	  the	  ten	  
seats	  in	  the	  city:	  Ilala,	  Kigamboni,	  Segerea	  and	  Mbagala”	  (Tanzanian	  	  Affairs,	  2016).	  
3.5. The	  “bulldozer”	  or	  the	  “builder”?	  The	  vulnerability	  of	  
the	  authoritarian	  coalition	  and	  the	  potential	  developmental	  
state	  under	  Magufuli	  
Magufuli’s	  electoral	  manifesto	  and	  personal	  campaign	  were	  centred	  on	  three	  main	  
promises.	  First,	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  crusade	  against	  corruption,	  tax	  evasion,	  smuggling	  and	  waste	  
in	  public	  offices,	  including	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  special	  court	  to	  fast-­‐track	  the	  prosecution	  
of	  those	  accused	  of	  corruption.	  During	  the	  campaign,	  Magufuli	  manage	  to	  capture	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  message	  of	  the	  oppositions,	  and	  openly	  denounced	  the	  widespread	  corruption	  
involving	  all	  political	  factions,	  within	  and	  outside	  CCM,	  and	  equally	  the	  public	  and	  private	  
sectors.	  The	  second	  electoral	  promise	  was	  to	  transform	  Tanzania	  into	  an	  industrialised	  
nation	  and,	  in	  particular,	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  number	  of	  related	  issues	  including	  the	  
shortage	  of	  energy;	  the	  lack	  of	  employment	  and	  investments	  in	  productive	  sectors	  and	  
infrastructures;	  the	  underutilisation	  of	  production	  capacity	  in	  former-­‐parastatals;	  land	  
disputes;	  and	  the	  limited	  diversification	  of	  the	  economy	  (see	  Section	  2).	  Magufuli	  made	  clear	  
that	  the	  government	  would	  play	  a	  direct	  role	  in	  driving	  the	  envisioned	  transformation	  of	  the	  
economy.	  Third,	  and	  finally,	  Magufuli	  promised	  to	  inject	  significant	  resources	  from	  the	  
government	  budget	  to	  finance	  free	  education	  at	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  levels,	  and	  to	  
enforce	  the	  allocation	  of	  these	  resources	  by	  preventing	  money	  leakages	  from	  the	  central	  to	  
the	  district	  levels.	  
The	  first	  fifteen	  months	  under	  President	  Magufuli	  –	  immediately	  renamed	  the	  “Bulldozer”	  –	  
were	  characterised	  by	  three	  consistent	  processes:	  (i)	  a	  relentless	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign;	  
(ii)	  the	  increasing	  centralisation	  of	  power	  under	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  presidency;	  (iii)	  the	  
systematic	  repression	  of	  excluded	  factions,	  including	  the	  oppositions	  and	  the	  media.	  These	  
processes	  clearly	  suggest	  a	  shift	  towards	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  settlement	  in	  
Tanzania,	  as	  some	  analysts	  have	  suggested.	  However,	  against	  this	  background	  of	  apparent	  
consistency	  and	  continuity,	  after	  the	  first	  nine	  months	  of	  the	  Magufuli	  presidency,	  some	  
evidence	  of	  discontinuity	  has	  started	  to	  emerge.	  While	  the	  political	  settlement	  is	  still	  in	  flux,	  
this	  new	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Magufuli	  is	  slowly	  moving	  towards	  a	  second	  phase	  of	  his	  
presidency	  in	  which	  he	  will	  be	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  his	  role	  as	  the	  “Builder”	  of	  a	  potential	  
developmental	  state	  settlement.	  	  
This	  developmental	  ambition	  is	  currently	  frustrated	  by	  the	  many	  vulnerabilities	  of	  his	  
authoritarian	  coalition,	  in	  particular	  with	  respect	  to:	  (i)	  the	  capacity	  of	  CCM	  to	  transform	  
itself,	  while	  retaining	  the	  support	  of	  lower	  level	  factions;	  (ii)	  the	  difficulties	  in	  engaging	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powerful	  organisations	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  maintain	  and	  improve	  productivity	  and	  
growth	  performances;	  (iii)	  the	  need	  to	  deliver	  tangible	  results	  and	  dissipate	  the	  mounting	  
dissent	  among	  the	  opposition	  and	  broader	  society	  (especially	  in	  large	  urban	  areas	  like	  Dar	  es	  
Salaam),	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  macroeconomic	  contraction.	  	  
Moreover,	  despite	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  crusade,	  the	  distribution	  of	  organisational	  
power,	  within	  and	  outside	  CCM,	  is	  still	  largely	  untouched.	  The	  main	  reason	  is	  that,	  as	  widely	  
documented	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  clientelistic	  networks	  linking	  powerful	  organisations	  in	  
Tanzania	  are	  deeply-­‐rooted	  in	  its	  history	  and	  have	  managed	  to	  survive	  multiple	  changes	  in	  
the	  political	  settlement.	  Thanks	  to	  these	  networks,	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  control	  ‘nodal’	  
institutions,	  powerful	  organisations	  have	  already	  shown	  signs	  of	  passive	  resistance,	  in	  some	  
cases	  even	  of	  active	  sabotage,	  as	  acknowledged	  in	  a	  recent	  article	  by	  the	  head	  of	  the	  CEO	  
Roundtable,	  Ali	  Mufuruki	  (2017)4.	  Magufuli	  has	  thus	  faced	  resistance	  on	  multiple	  levels	  in	  
implementing	  and	  enforcing	  a	  systematic	  developmental	  state	  agenda.	  The	  building	  of	  a	  
powerful	  network	  within	  CCM,	  and	  across	  segments	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  supporting	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  potential	  developmental	  state	  coalition,	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  much	  more	  
challenging	  than	  “bulldozing”	  the	  entrenched	  power	  structure	  in	  Tanzania.	  
The	  “Bulldozer”	  phase	  
During	  his	  first	  nine	  months	  in	  government,	  Magufuli	  managed	  to	  capture	  the	  imagination	  of	  
the	  electorate	  with	  a	  number	  of	  popular	  initiatives	  and	  unexpected	  anti-­‐corruption	  
operations	  (Tanzanian	  Affairs,	  January	  2017).	  The	  restrictions	  on	  public	  expenditures	  such	  as	  
foreign	  travel	  for	  public	  officials,	  expensive	  public	  celebrations,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  hotels	  for	  
government	  meetings,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  immediate	  transfer	  of	  these	  savings	  to	  finance	  
hospitals	  and	  schools	  gained	  Magufuli	  significant	  popularity.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  numerous	  
anti-­‐corruption	  operations	  were	  enforced,	  including	  the	  immediate	  calling	  of	  a	  7-­‐day	  
ultimatum	  to	  businessmen	  suspected	  of	  tax	  evasion;	  the	  rooting-­‐out	  of	  16,000	  “ghost	  
workers”;	  finally,	  the	  firing	  of	  several	  civil	  servants,	  including	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  Tanzania	  
Investment	  Centre	  (TIC),	  Tanzania	  Communications	  Regulatory	  Authority	  (TCRA),	  the	  
Tanzania	  Revenue	  Authority	  (TRA),	  the	  Tanzania	  Ports	  Authority	  (TPA),	  the	  Reli	  Assets	  
Holding	  Company	  Limited	  (RAHCO),	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  City	  Council,	  and	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  
Prevention	  and	  Combating	  of	  Corruption	  Bureau	  (PCCB).	  Magufuli’s	  direct	  involvement	  in	  
many	  of	  these	  operations	  (including	  raids	  on	  government	  offices),	  and	  the	  persistence	  in	  
prosecuting	  (or	  simply	  removing	  or	  transferring)	  allegedly	  corrupted	  people	  at	  all	  
government	  levels,	  was	  unprecedented.	  Many	  of	  the	  targeted	  government	  officials	  were	  
appointed	  by	  Kikwete,	  for	  example	  the	  Chief	  Secretary	  Ombeni	  Sefue	  (this	  is	  probably	  the	  
most	  important	  role	  in	  the	  civil	  service).	  	  
In	  his	  attempt	  to	  dismantle	  the	  existing	  clientelistic	  networks,	  Magufuli	  built	  up	  a	  lean	  
government	  composed	  of	  personally	  trusted	  people.	  Magufuli	  had	  worked	  with	  some	  of	  
them	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Work	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  current	  Chief	  Secretary,	  Ambassador	  
	  
4	  In	  his	  article,	  Mufuruki	  warned	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  “criminal	  networks,	  racketeers	  and	  private	  sector	  beneficiaries	  of	  
corruption	  will	  no	  doubt	  work	  in	  alliance	  with	  their	  friends	  in	  government	  to	  ensure	  that	  anti-­‐corruption	  institutions	  do	  not	  
gain	  strength”.	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Kijazi)	  or	  for	  his	  electoral	  campaign	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  current	  Permanent	  Secretary	  
Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  James	  Dotto);	  others	  were	  people	  with	  reputation	  for	  a	  solid	  
background	  and	  competence	  (for	  example,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  Philip	  Mpango);	  finally,	  a	  
certain	  number	  of	  new	  appointees	  are	  from	  his	  parliamentary	  constituency	  (Chato),	  in	  some	  
cases	  even	  from	  Magufuli’s	  extended	  family.	  Magufuli	  also	  adopted	  a	  typical	  tactic	  from	  
Nyerere’s	  playbook,	  where	  to	  avert	  tensions	  or	  the	  ‘loss	  of	  stability	  of	  the	  party’	  he	  would	  
transfer	  people	  to	  other	  places	  or	  roles	  to	  diminish	  their	  influence.	  We	  have	  seen	  Magufuli	  
adopting	  this	  strategy	  already,	  sometimes	  as	  a	  way	  to	  diffuse	  tensions	  around	  a	  corruption	  
scandal.	  	  
Magufuli	  also	  made	  extensive	  use	  of	  his	  power	  of	  patronage,	  by	  appointing	  civil	  servants	  
from	  Assistant	  Director	  upwards,	  general	  managers	  of	  parastatals,	  judges,	  ambassadors,	  
university	  deans	  and	  other	  prestigious	  posts.	  In	  particular,	  Regional	  Commissioners	  and	  
District	  Commissioners	  are	  typically	  administrative	  civil	  servants,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  CCM	  
operatives	  who	  chair	  security	  committee	  meetings	  in	  their	  respective	  areas	  (Citizen,	  27	  June	  
2016).	  Interestingly,	  a	  number	  of	  the	  new	  appointees	  are	  members	  of	  an	  established	  
network	  of	  academics	  around	  the	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  where	  Magufuli	  studied.	  On	  
the	  contrary,	  a	  number	  of	  prominent	  CCM	  figures	  who	  allegedly	  supported	  his	  nomination	  
as	  presidential	  candidate	  remain	  outside	  the	  government.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  Magufuli	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  remained	  distant,	  if	  not	  
confrontational,	  throughout	  his	  first	  nine	  months.	  Historically	  in	  Tanzania,	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  mistrust,	  despite	  
widespread	  clientelistic	  networks,	  and	  even	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  various	  Tanzanian-­‐Asian	  
businesses	  to	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  This	  mistrust	  did	  not	  impede	  the	  formation	  of	  corrupted	  
deals.	  In	  fact,	  since	  the	  Nyerere	  era,	  businessmen	  have	  ‘picked	  winners’	  in	  the	  CCM	  party	  to	  
capture	  rents;	  in	  other	  cases,	  they	  have	  ‘picked	  losers’	  to	  fight	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  their	  
powerful	  supporters	  and	  thus	  build	  up	  a	  new	  ruling	  coalition.	  Both	  the	  CCM	  presidential	  
primaries	  and	  the	  national	  election	  campaigns	  have	  always	  been	  the	  main	  context	  for	  deal	  
making/alliance	  building.	  However,	  exactly	  because	  the	  clientelistic	  networks	  have	  been	  
fluid,	  that	  is,	  they	  have	  overlapped	  and	  shifted	  over	  time,	  mistrust	  has	  dominated	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  sector.	  
In	  his	  first	  public	  meeting	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  early	  December	  2015,	  Magufuli	  made	  it	  
clear	  that	  he	  would	  not	  let	  businessmen	  “play	  with	  his	  government”5,	  and	  that	  he	  was	  open	  
to	  establishing	  a	  new	  relationship	  with	  them	  (JamiiForums,	  2015).	  In	  front	  of	  two	  main	  
delegations	  from	  the	  Tanzania	  Private	  Sector	  Foundation	  (led	  by	  Reginald	  Mengi),	  and	  the	  
CEO	  Roundtable	  (led	  by	  Ali	  Mufuruki),	  Magufuli	  stressed	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  work	  with	  
businessmen	  to	  industrialise	  Tanzania,	  but	  that	  he	  would	  not	  tolerate	  corruption	  and	  tax	  
evasion.	  The	  announcement	  was	  immediately	  translated	  into	  a	  seven	  day	  ultimatum	  with	  
	  
5	  The	  exact	  words	  were	  ‘there	  is	  a	  government,	  that	  government	  is	  John	  Pombe	  Magufuli’s	  government,	  and	  it	  will	  not	  
happen,	  in	  my	  term	  that	  the	  business	  community	  will	  run	  my	  government’.	  Another	  thing	  he	  mentioned	  was	  what	  he	  
termed	  as	  ‘people	  using	  the	  power	  of	  their	  money	  to	  oppress	  other	  people’.	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  he	  was	  singling	  Yusuf	  Manji	  (a	  
famous	  Asian	  businessman)	  who	  was	  in	  a	  fight	  with	  the	  Kinondoni	  Council	  over	  the	  Coco	  Beach	  plot	  where	  he	  wanted	  to	  
build	  a	  hotel	  and	  other	  properties.	  President	  Magufuli	  stated	  that	  Coco	  beach	  was	  public	  property	  and	  he	  would	  not	  let	  one	  
person	  take	  it	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  millions	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  residents.	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respect	  to	  the	  “missing	  containers	  saga”,	  involving	  prominent	  businessmen	  (Citizen,	  8	  
December	  2015).	  Magufuli’s	  threat	  was	  perceived	  as	  credible	  by	  the	  business	  community,	  
and	  many	  companies	  lined	  up	  to	  pay	  their	  duties	  for	  a	  total	  of	  Sh8.6	  billion,	  including	  
Bakhressa	  who	  paid	  Sh2	  billion	  in	  few	  days.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  11,	  since	  2002	  Tanzania	  has	  
been	  the	  worst	  performer	  in	  the	  East	  African	  Region	  in	  terms	  of	  tax	  revenue	  collection,	  
although	  signs	  of	  improvements	  have	  been	  registered	  in	  2015/16.	  
Figure	  14:	  Tax	  revenue	  collection	  in	  Tanzania,	  composition	  and	  comparators	  
	   	  
Source:	  Source:	  Tanzanian	  authorities	  and	  IMF	  staff	  calculations,	  2017	  
In	  early	  2016,	  the	  scarcity	  of	  sugar	  in	  the	  country	  led	  to	  another	  strong	  anti-­‐corruption	  
operation.	  Official	  statistics	  state	  that	  Tanzania	  has	  about	  100,000	  –	  120,000	  tons	  of	  sugar	  
deficit	  annually.	  The	  sugar	  factories	  in	  the	  country	  are	  unable	  to	  meet	  the	  local	  demand,	  
particularly	  industrial	  sugar	  used	  for	  manufacturing	  canned	  drinks.	  The	  sugar	  industry	  is	  
regulated	  by	  the	  Sugar	  Board,	  which	  issues	  permits	  for	  the	  importation	  of	  sugar.	  This	  
arrangement	  has	  historically	  led	  to	  various	  forms	  of	  collusion	  between	  importers	  and	  the	  
Sugar	  Board	  (Cooksey,	  2011).	  To	  tackle	  this	  issue,	  Magufuli	  ordered	  that	  all	  the	  permits	  had	  
to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  Office.	  Sugar	  prices	  soared	  by	  100	  percent	  in	  a	  few	  
weeks.	  As	  a	  response,	  Magufuli	  ordered	  regional	  commissioners	  and	  police	  officers	  to	  
inspect	  warehouses	  for	  sugar	  ‘hoarders’.	  In	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  Dodoma,	  a	  few	  businessmen	  
were	  arrested	  (or	  had	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  had	  so	  much	  sugar	  in	  their	  warehouses).	  Many	  of	  
these	  businessmen	  were	  Tanzanian	  Asian	  whose	  sugar,	  it	  was	  reported,	  was	  impounded	  in	  
the	  port	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (Citizen,	  February	  2016).	  	  
Another	  set	  of	  episodes,	  signalled	  the	  increasingly	  conflicted	  relationship	  between	  Magufuli	  
and	  the	  private	  sector,	  including	  foreign	  businesses.	  During	  Kikwete’s	  presidency,	  a	  law	  was	  
passed	  to	  make	  it	  compulsory	  for	  companies	  in	  the	  Telecom	  sector	  to	  list	  25	  percent	  of	  their	  
shares	  in	  the	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  Stock	  Exchange	  (DSE).	  Under	  Kikwete,	  the	  companies	  resisted	  
this	  move,	  saying	  that	  the	  local	  market	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  absorb	  such	  big	  
companies.	  The	  major	  mobile	  companies	  are	  foreign	  owned	  and	  include	  Vodacom	  
(Vodafone	  -­‐	  UK),	  Tigo	  (MIC	  –	  Luxembourg),	  Airtel	  (Indian),	  Zantel	  (MIC	  –	  Luxembourg)	  and	  
Viettel	  (Vietnam).	  Magufuli	  instructed	  the	  companies	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  existing	  law	  by	  
June	  28.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  these	  companies	  told	  the	  State	  House	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  do	  so	  
in	  such	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  In	  response,	  Magufuli	  gave	  telecom	  companies	  a	  6	  months	  
ultimatum:	  either	  ‘list	  or	  leave’.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2016	  Vodacom	  and	  MIC	  submitted	  their	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During	  this	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  Magufuli	  Presidency,	  the	  reaction	  from	  the	  business	  
community	  was	  largely	  negative,	  although	  a	  number	  of	  businessmen,	  especially	  Ali	  Mufuruki	  
and	  Reginald	  Mengi,	  had	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  endorsed	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts,	  
while	  warning	  about	  potential	  short-­‐term	  macroeconomic	  risks.	  In	  June,	  for	  example,	  in	  a	  
special	  report	  on	  ‘Investing	  in	  Tanzania’,	  the	  tycoon	  Reginald	  Mengi	  (with	  investments	  in	  
manufacturing,	  media,	  soft	  drinks,	  mining	  and	  technology)	  described	  the	  situation	  in	  
Tanzania	  as	  a	  place	  “full	  of	  holes”.	  He	  also	  added	  that	  he	  had	  lost	  out	  on	  at	  least	  two	  big	  
deals	  due	  to	  corruption	  (Financial	  Times,	  2016b).	  According	  to	  him,	  in	  2015	  Tanzania	  “had	  
reached	  tipping	  point”	  and	  that	  Magufuli’s	  bulldozer	  approach	  was	  a	  necessary	  response.	  
Mengi	  also	  stressed	  that	  Magufuli	  needed	  to	  articulate	  and	  align	  his	  economic	  policies	  in	  a	  
more	  systematic	  way.	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  along	  similar	  lines,	  while	  praising	  the	  president	  
for	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  crusade,	  Mufuruki	  warned	  the	  government	  about	  the	  immediate	  
shortcomings	  and	  instability	  of	  the	  approach	  undertaken	  by	  Magufuli,	  in	  particular	  the	  
implosion	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  due	  to	  the	  losses	  of	  uncompetitive	  firms,	  and	  the	  potential	  
liquidity	  crisis6.	  	  
The	  reduction	  of	  liquidity	  in	  the	  system	  suggests	  that	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  
interventions	  (e.g.	  tax	  collection	  enforcement,	  including	  duties	  for	  goods	  on	  transit)	  had	  
been	  effective.	  This	  might	  have	  been	  the	  case,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (as	  testified	  by	  
increasing	  levels	  of	  tax	  collections).	  However,	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  this	  liquidity	  contraction	  
was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  business	  organisations	  became	  unable	  to	  function	  given	  the	  
removal	  of	  key	  nodal	  figures	  in	  the	  clientelistic	  networks,	  while	  the	  public	  sector	  was	  
paralysed	  by	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  of	  fear	  imposed	  by	  Magufuli.	  	  
Magufuli	  personal	  crusade	  against-­‐corruption,	  and	  his	  centralisation	  of	  power	  around	  a	  
trusted	  network	  of	  people	  beyond	  CCM,	  has	  proceeded	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  an	  increasing	  
pressure	  on	  excluded	  factions,	  that	  is,	  the	  party	  oppositions	  and	  the	  media.	  Since	  January	  
2016,	  the	  Cybercrimes	  Act	  2015	  passed	  by	  Kikwete	  in	  February	  2015,	  has	  been	  used	  to	  place	  
controls	  on	  social	  media,	  while	  a	  number	  of	  radios,	  reporters	  and	  newspapers	  were	  
threatened,	  closed	  or	  even	  arrested7.	  The	  opposition	  has	  largely	  boycotted	  parliamentary	  
sessions,	  they	  have	  not	  been	  given	  any	  major	  chairmanships	  of	  key	  parliamentary	  
committees	  (as	  was	  the	  practice	  since	  1995),	  and	  vocal	  committee	  members	  like	  Zitto	  
Kabwe	  (former	  Chair	  of	  the	  Public	  Accounts	  Committee)	  were	  given	  minor	  roles.	  In	  June	  
2016	  the	  President	  also	  announced	  a	  ban	  on	  political	  rallies	  (later	  extended	  to	  cover	  indoor	  
party	  meetings)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  elections	  were	  over	  and	  that	  these	  meetings	  would	  
have	  distracted	  government	  action.	  
	   	  
	  
6	  Mufuruki,	  alongside	  Reginald	  Mengi,	  Iddi	  Simba	  and	  Juma	  Mwapachu	  (all	  of	  them	  former	  chairmen	  of	  the	  Confederation	  
of	  Tanzanian	  Industry,	  Cti)	  are	  amongst	  the	  very	  few	  African	  businessmen	  from	  Tanzania	  (Therkildsen	  and	  Bourgouin,	  
2012).	  
7	  In	  April	  2015,	  the	  Statistics	  Act	  dictated	  which	  research	  organisations	  may	  generate	  and	  publish	  national	  statistics.	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This	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  parliamentary	  oppositions	  and	  the	  media	  started	  during	  the	  
second	  Kikwete	  government,	  and	  became	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  
coalition	  led	  by	  CCM	  under	  Magufuli’s	  presidency.	  By	  repressing	  the	  use	  of	  rallies	  to	  mobilise	  
discontent	  among	  various	  segments	  of	  the	  society,	  the	  government	  has	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  
for	  CHADEMA	  to	  address	  one	  of	  its	  main	  weaknesses,	  that	  is,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  local	  well-­‐
grounded	  party	  structure.	  Rallies	  are	  particular	  popular	  in	  Tanzania	  and,	  thus,	  very	  
important	  in	  shaping	  public	  opinion	  and	  preparing	  for	  national	  elections.	  While	  the	  ban	  on	  
rallies	  will	  likely	  be	  lifted	  during	  the	  two-­‐month	  campaign	  for	  the	  2020	  elections,	  Magufuli’s	  
control	  of	  the	  media	  and	  policy	  space	  has	  forced	  CHADEMA	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  strategy	  for	  
mobilising	  its	  electorate.	  CHADEMA	  has	  increasingly	  centred	  its	  policy	  action	  on	  various	  
protests	  in	  defence	  of	  democracy	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  against	  an	  authoritarian	  turn	  under	  
Magufuli,	  including	  invitations	  to	  civil	  disobedience	  and	  peaceful	  resistance	  (Paget,	  2017).	  	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  initiatives	  have	  been	  able	  to	  shift	  public	  opinion	  and	  organise	  the	  
oppositions	  is	  disputable.	  Interestingly,	  Operation	  UKUTA	  aimed	  at	  building	  an	  “Alliance	  
Against	  Dictatorship	  in	  Tanzania”	  failed	  to	  materialise	  in	  September	  2016,	  and	  CHADEMA	  
renounced	  the	  launch	  of	  its	  nation-­‐wide	  campaign,	  claiming	  that	  it	  could	  have	  resulted	  in	  
violence.	  Critical	  voices	  suggested	  that,	  in	  fact,	  CHADEMA	  feared	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  operation	  
UKUTA,	  in	  particular	  its	  capacity	  to	  mobilise	  widespread	  support	  among	  the	  population.	  An	  
opinion	  poll	  survey	  conducted	  in	  June	  2016,	  and	  published	  by	  Twaweza	  in	  September	  2016,	  
provides	  a	  composite	  snapshot	  of	  the	  evolving	  support	  for	  Magufuli	  in	  Tanzania	  (Twaweza,	  
Brief	  35).	  Although	  less	  than	  one	  in	  twenty	  citizens	  reported	  being	  well-­‐informed	  about	  
national	  politics,	  the	  president	  had	  a	  plebiscitary	  approval.	  The	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures,	  in	  
particular	  the	  dismissal	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  identification	  of	  ‘ghost	  workers’,	  alongside	  the	  
increase	  in	  the	  government	  budget	  allocation	  for	  free	  education,	  were	  the	  main	  reasons	  
behind	  Magufuli’s	  popularity.	  However,	  some	  people	  criticised	  his	  import	  ban	  on	  sugar,	  and	  
the	  fact	  that	  due	  process	  was	  not	  followed	  in	  dismissing	  allegedly	  corrupted	  officials.	  
To	  recap,	  three	  main	  processes	  characterised	  the	  first	  “bulldozer”	  phase	  of	  Magufuli’s	  
presidency:	  
• Centralisation	  of	  power,	  and	  distancing	  from	  CCM	  elite	  and	  lower	  level	  factions	  
• Confrontational	  and	  authoritarian	  approach	  towards	  the	  private	  sector	  
• Increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  parliamentary	  oppositions	  and	  the	  media.	  
These	  processes	  delineate	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania	  towards	  a	  
vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition.	  While	  a	  number	  of	  these	  features	  persist	  in	  what	  we	  call	  
here	  the	  second	  “building	  phase”	  in	  Magufuli’s	  presidency,	  there	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  
discontinuities	  that	  suggests	  a	  potential	  gradual	  change	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  towards	  a	  
more	  developmental	  configuration.	  While	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  confirm	  this	  shift,	  the	  next	  section	  
analyses	  the	  evidence	  available	  so	  far	  and	  proposes	  alternative	  ways	  to	  look	  ahead	  at	  
Magufuli’s	  presidency.	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The	  “Builder”	  phase	  
There	  is	  some	  evidence	  suggesting	  that,	  since	  late	  summer	  2016,	  Magufuli	  has	  started	  
addressing	  some	  of	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  his	  authoritarian	  coalition,	  in	  particular	  with	  
respect	  to	  CCM	  and	  the	  private	  sector,	  while	  pressure	  on	  the	  oppositions	  and	  media	  has	  
even	  increased.	  So	  far,	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency	  has	  been	  characterised	  
by:	  
• Centralisation	  and	  institutionalisation	  of	  power	  within	  CCM	  and	  some	  initial	  forms	  of	  
network	  (mtandao)	  politics	  and	  coalition	  building;	  
• Disciplining	  rents,	  with	  a	  direct	  involvement	  in	  deal-­‐making	  and	  infrastructures;	  
• Repression	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  oppositions	  and	  the	  media.	  
In	  the	  following	  part	  of	  this	  sub-­‐section	  we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  first	  two	  changes,	  as	  the	  last	  
one	  simply	  suggests	  an	  escalation	  of	  the	  same	  authoritarian	  trends	  observed	  in	  the	  first	  
phase	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency	  and	  the	  previous	  government.	  In	  particular,	  by	  making	  
discretional	  use	  of	  the	  2015	  Cybercrimes	  Act	  a	  number	  of	  popular	  voices	  (including	  the	  
popular	  social	  media	  Jamiiforums)	  were	  silenced8.	  Moreover,	  in	  November	  2016	  the	  Media	  
Services	  Act	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  two	  state-­‐sponsored	  authorities	  in	  charge	  of	  
granting	  and	  revoking	  licenses	  for	  news	  houses,	  and	  responsible	  for	  the	  accreditation	  of	  
journalists.	  These	  new	  controlling	  institutions,	  alongside	  the	  President’s	  repeated	  threats	  to	  
media	  publishing	  potential	  defamatory	  or	  sedition	  materials,	  resulted	  in	  self-­‐censorship	  
among	  journalists	  and	  media.	  
On	  23	  July	  2016	  the	  new	  President	  of	  Tanzania,	  Magufuli,	  was	  nominated	  Chair	  of	  CCM.	  On	  
that	  occasion,	  Magufuli	  openly	  stressed	  that	  his	  nomination	  to	  the	  presidency	  was	  a	  proof	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  Kikwete	  was	  not	  personally	  corrupted	  (Guardian	  on	  Sunday,	  24	  July).	  Since	  
then,	  Magufuli	  has	  started	  rebuilding	  his	  networks	  within	  CCM.	  Interestingly,	  during	  the	  first	  
phase	  of	  his	  presidency,	  Magufuli	  had	  often	  projected	  himself	  as	  “the	  president	  for	  all	  
regardless	  of	  party	  affiliation”	  and	  referred	  to	  “my	  government”,	  not	  the	  CCM	  government.	  
This	  was	  in	  striking	  contrast	  with	  all	  previous	  presidents	  (Kabendera,	  2016	  August).	  
However,	  in	  this	  second	  phase	  of	  his	  presidency,	  while	  maintaining	  a	  form	  of	  embedded	  
autonomy	  within	  CCM,	  Magufuli	  has	  started	  talking	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  “the	  party	  should	  not	  
follow	  an	  individual	  member,	  but	  members	  should	  instead	  follow	  the	  party”	  and	  that	  “the	  
party	  must	  be	  owned	  by	  its	  members,	  instead	  of	  the	  party	  being	  owned	  by	  just	  one	  
member”	  (Guardian,	  14	  December).	  	  
At	  the	  13	  December	  2016	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Executive	  Committee	  (NEC)	  (hosted	  in	  the	  
State	  House	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  recent	  memories)	  Magufuli	  managed	  to	  push	  through	  a	  
profound	  reform	  of	  the	  CCM	  machinery	  apparatus.	  Building	  on	  a	  new	  rhetoric,	  Magufuli	  
called	  for	  a	  “great	  transformation	  of	  our	  party”	  involving	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  number	  of	  
members	  in	  CCM	  decision-­‐making	  organs	  at	  all	  levels;	  also,	  as	  Chair	  of	  CCM,	  Magufuli	  
	  
8	  In	  May	  2015	  Kikwete	  signed	  into	  law	  the	  Cyber	  Crimes	  Act.	  This	  law	  was	  deliberately	  vague	  and	  has	  since	  then	  allowed	  
room	  to	  prosecute	  people	  ‘who	  may	  cause	  unrest’	  through	  utterances	  or	  defame	  leaders.	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promoted	  the	  centralisation	  and	  streamlining	  of	  the	  party’s	  operations	  to	  cut	  costs.	  The	  
CCM	  issued	  a	  press	  statement	  explaining	  that	  the	  National	  Executive	  Council	  has	  reduced	  
the	  number	  of	  the	  following	  organs.	  
• NEC	  Members	  are	  reduced	  from	  the	  current	  number	  of	  388	  to	  158	  (Made	  up	  of	  party	  
regional	  chairmen	  (36),	  NEC	  regional	  members	  (50),	  NEC	  national	  members	  (30),	  
presidential	  appointee	  (7),	  CCM	  Youth	  Wing	  (5),	  Women’s	  wing	  (5),	  Elders	  (5),	  
Parliamentary	  representatives	  (5),	  Secretary	  to	  CCM’s	  parliamentarians,	  and	  elected	  
leaders	  such	  as	  speaker,	  PM.	  Vice	  President	  and	  Zanzibar	  President	  together	  with	  his	  vice	  
president.	  The	  NEC	  meetings	  are	  now	  after	  every	  six	  months,	  instead	  of	  after	  four	  
months.	  
• Central	  Committee	  (CC)	  is	  now	  24	  people,	  not	  34	  people	  anymore,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  
presidential	  appointees.	  NEC	  meetings	  are	  now	  after	  every	  four	  months,	  not	  after	  two	  
months.	  	  
The	  official	  press	  statement	  also	  announced	  that	  “these	  changes	  are	  aimed	  at	  taking	  our	  
party	  back	  to	  the	  people	  and	  they	  have	  been	  approved	  unanimously	  by	  all	  NEC	  members	  
who	  attended	  the	  meeting”	  (Guardian,	  14	  December	  2016).	  
With	  these	  reforms	  Magufuli	  has	  clearly	  attempted	  to	  rebrand	  the	  party	  and	  rebuild	  its	  
damaged	  legitimacy	  among	  large	  segments	  of	  the	  electorate.	  More	  critically,	  his	  reforms	  
suggest	  that	  Magufuli	  is	  attempting	  to	  strengthen	  and	  institutionalise	  his	  control	  of	  the	  
party,	  as	  well	  as	  reduce	  the	  policy	  money	  involved	  in	  the	  presidential	  primaries.	  In	  the	  same	  
meeting	  at	  the	  Senate	  House,	  Magufuli	  restated	  how	  he	  did	  not	  spend	  a	  single	  shilling	  during	  
CCM’s	  presidential	  nomination	  process	  in	  2015,	  while	  other	  candidates	  were	  alleged	  to	  have	  
spent	  billions	  of	  shillings	  until	  the	  very	  last	  day,	  to	  buy	  votes	  and	  be	  shortlisted	  as	  the	  party	  
presidential	  candidate.	  He	  also	  stressed	  that	  further	  measures	  were	  going	  to	  be	  taken	  at	  
national,	  regional	  and	  district	  levels	  against	  all	  CCM	  members	  who	  sabotaged	  the	  party	  in	  
the	  October	  2015	  elections.	  Finally	  13	  out	  of	  26	  heads	  of	  regions	  were	  newly	  appointed,	  
while	  five	  were	  transferred	  (Guardian,	  14	  December	  2016).	  	  
Within	  this	  new	  CCM	  power	  structure,	  the	  presidential	  appointment	  of	  key	  powerful	  people	  
(which	  was	  also	  common	  in	  the	  bulldozer	  phase)	  signals	  a	  qualitative	  shift	  towards	  a	  more	  
mature	  form	  of	  network	  politics	  in	  the	  Magufuli	  presidency9.	  The	  appointment	  of	  the	  former	  
first	  lady	  Salma	  Kikwete	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  parliament	  on	  the	  2	  March	  2017	  is	  another	  
example	  of	  the	  ongoing	  building	  up	  of	  a	  new	  coalition	  within	  CCM	  in	  support	  of	  Magufuli	  
and	  his	  presidential	  nomination	  in	  2020.	  Salma	  Kikwete	  is	  very	  popular	  in	  Lindi,	  Mtwara	  and	  
Rufiji,	  and	  has	  significant	  political	  power	  brokering.	  
The	  development	  of	  new	  coalitions	  involving	  powerful	  organisations	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  
the	  other	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency.	  While	  
maintaining	  an	  authoritarian	  approach,	  Magufuli	  has	  started	  signalling	  the	  private	  sector	  
	  
9	  President	  Mkapa	  is	  famous	  for	  warning	  those	  who	  were	  not	  supporting	  him	  that	  ‘You	  must	  remember,	  all	  CCM	  candidates	  
must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  NEC	  and	  CC,	  I	  am	  the	  chair	  of	  both	  meetings,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  members	  of	  those	  meetings	  are	  my	  
appointees’.	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(including	  Tanzanian	  Asian	  businesses)	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  deal-­‐making,	  involving	  the	  
allocation	  of	  rents	  for	  productive	  investments	  in	  industrial	  sectors.	  	  
In	  October	  2016	  Magufuli	  inaugurated	  a	  $120	  million	  fruit	  processing	  factory	  in	  the	  outskirts	  
of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam10	  (Citizen,	  2016c).	  The	  investment	  was	  made	  by	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  
Tanzanian	  Asian	  businessmen,	  Salid	  Salim	  Bakhresa,	  who	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  missing	  
container	  saga	  in	  November	  2015	  (see	  above).	  The	  inauguration	  of	  the	  new	  plant	  was	  made	  
in	  a	  media	  event	  in	  which	  Magufuli	  endorsed	  Bakhresa’s	  investment,	  and	  praised	  him	  as	  a	  
model	  entrepreneur	  who	  creates	  jobs	  and	  pays	  taxes.	  Magufuli	  ordered	  TANESCO	  to	  ensure	  
the	  new	  plant	  had	  access	  to	  the	  10MW	  needed	  to	  operate	  at	  full	  capacity,	  and	  invited	  
Bakhresa	  to	  expand	  his	  investment	  in	  fruit	  processing	  in	  other	  regions,	  promising	  him	  free	  
land	  for	  that	  purpose.	  Magufuli	  also	  challenged	  Bakhresa,	  asking	  him	  to	  build	  a	  new	  sugar	  
factory	  to	  produce	  industrial	  sugar	  domestically,	  again	  promising	  free	  land	  to	  plant	  
sugarcane	  and	  to	  build	  a	  processing	  plant.	  The	  day	  after	  the	  inauguration,	  Magufuli	  also	  
ordered	  that	  the	  confiscated	  1000	  tonnes	  of	  sugar	  owned	  by	  Bakhresa	  should	  be	  released.	  If	  
this	  release	  followed	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  eight	  months	  tax	  dispute	  is	  not	  known	  (Citizen,	  
2016c)11.	  A	  few	  weeks	  later,	  on	  21	  October,	  the	  National	  Social	  Security	  Fund	  (NSSF)	  and	  PPF	  
Fund	  turned	  Magufuli’s	  request	  to	  link	  social	  security	  with	  industrialisation	  into	  a	  new	  plan	  
for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  joint	  sugar	  processing	  factory	  at	  Mkunazini,	  Ngerengere	  in	  
Morogoro	  Region.	  Magufuli,	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion,	  had	  asked	  the	  NSSF	  and	  PPF	  fund	  
to	  divert	  their	  investments	  from	  the	  construction	  sector	  towards	  manufacturing	  industries.	  	  
The	  Bakhresa	  episode	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Magufuli	  signalled	  the	  private	  
sector	  that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  allocate	  rents	  to	  private	  investors,	  but	  that	  he	  would	  discipline	  
these	  rents.	  Secondly,	  he	  also	  showed	  that	  he	  would	  support	  the	  productive	  reinvestment	  of	  
rents	  accumulated	  during	  previous	  governments12.	  During	  his	  speech,	  he	  openly	  asked	  
people	  who	  shaded	  huge	  amounts	  of	  money	  to	  invest	  them	  in	  new	  industries.	  Magufuli’s	  
message	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Minister	  for	  Industry,	  Trade	  and	  Investment,	  Charles	  
Mwijage,	  who	  announced	  new	  investments	  in	  the	  Coastal	  regions.	  In	  particular,	  the	  ongoing	  
construction	  by	  Chinese	  investors	  (Goodwill	  Ceramic	  Limited)	  of	  a	  new	  tiles-­‐manufacturing	  
plant	  worth	  $100	  million,	  employing	  1500	  workers	  (plus	  other	  3000	  indirectly	  employed).	  
This	  was	  again	  a	  way	  to	  signal	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  President	  to	  engage	  with	  both	  domestic	  
and	  foreign	  investors,	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  clientelistic	  networks	  which	  had	  traditionally	  
favoured	  businessmen	  close	  to	  CCM	  factions.	  Moreover,	  the	  announcement	  of	  significant	  
public	  investment	  in	  the	  sugar	  sector	  reveals	  Magufuli’s	  willingness	  to	  start	  new	  forms	  of	  
direct	  public	  investments	  operated	  by	  local	  authorities.	  
	  
10	  The	  investment	  in	  Mwandege,	  Mukuranga	  District,	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  process	  between	  20,000	  and	  25,000	  tonnes	  of	  
fruit	  per	  year	  and	  employ	  600	  permanent	  workers,	  according	  to	  company	  officials.	  
11	  While	  he	  was	  inviting	  Bakhresa	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  sugar	  industry,	  Magufuli	  was	  at	  the	  same	  time	  engaged	  with	  the	  
resolution	  of	  a	  longstanding	  dispute	  with	  the	  Swedish	  company	  Bagamoyo	  EcoEnergy	  (BEE).	  The	  dispute	  ended	  with	  the	  
government	  revoking	  BEE’s	  title	  of	  its	  land	  (Africa	  Confidential,	  2017,	  vol	  58).	  Sugar	  is	  a	  highly	  political	  issue	  in	  Tanzania,	  as	  
it	  highlights	  the	  fundamental	  tensions	  between	  importers/smugglers	  and	  manufacturers	  involved	  in	  local	  production.	  In	  
fact,	  the	  import/smuggling	  of	  sugar	  is	  also	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  perennial	  tensions	  between	  mainland	  and	  the	  islands	  
(Therkildsen,	  2011).	  	  
12	  In	  December	  2016,	  the	  Quality	  Group	  Limited	  (QGL),	  the	  largest	  conglomerate	  in	  Tanzania	  owned	  by	  the	  Manji	  family,	  
commissioned	  a	  $50	  million	  sugar	  plants	  in	  Morogoro	  and	  Pemba.	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This	  new	  approach	  to	  industrial	  policy	  signals	  a	  marked	  difference	  from	  both	  the	  first	  phase	  
of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency	  and	  previous	  governments.	  The	  following	  case	  is	  particularly	  
relevant.	  During	  the	  last	  Kikwete	  presidency,	  in	  May	  2015,	  the	  richest	  African	  businessman,	  
Aliko	  Dangote,	  was	  given	  a	  generous	  incentives	  package	  to	  construct	  a	  $500	  million	  cement	  
factory	  plant	  in	  Mtwara.	  The	  Tanzania	  Investment	  Centre	  (TIC)	  gave	  Dangote	  incentives	  
including	  land,	  tax	  breaks	  for	  diesel	  imports,	  tax	  waivers	  on	  machinery,	  accelerated	  work	  
permits	  for	  expatriates,	  and	  an	  allowance	  to	  import	  coal	  from	  South	  Africa.	  According	  to	  
media	  coverage	  (Citizen,	  2016d),	  some	  of	  these	  incentives	  became	  unsustainable,	  as	  the	  
other	  three	  major	  players	  asked	  for	  the	  same,	  pointing	  to	  the	  unfair	  competition	  in	  the	  
sector.	  Only	  six	  months	  after	  Dangote’s	  cement	  production	  started,	  the	  price	  of	  cement	  in	  
Tanzania	  collapsed	  (a	  20	  percent	  drop	  to	  $4.50	  for	  50Kg),	  and	  Dangote	  managed	  to	  capture	  
one	  fourth	  of	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  
When	  Magufuli	  banned	  the	  import	  of	  coal,	  arguing	  that	  the	  local	  coal	  industry	  should	  be	  
linked	  forward,	  Dangote	  lamented	  that	  the	  deal	  with	  Kikwete	  had	  not	  been	  honoured.	  The	  
cement	  factory	  stopped	  producing	  in	  November	  2016,	  for	  unspecified	  technical	  reasons.	  It	  is	  
widely	  thought	  that	  this	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  force	  the	  government	  to	  negotiate	  a	  deal.	  The	  
negotiation	  saw	  the	  personal	  involvement	  of	  Magufuli,	  who	  reached	  an	  agreement	  with	  
Dangote	  on	  13	  December	  2016.	  While	  the	  government	  did	  not	  disclose	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
deal,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  Magufuli	  adopted	  the	  same	  strategy	  used	  by	  the	  Ethiopian	  
government	  to	  strike	  a	  deal	  with	  Dangote	  for	  a	  similar	  cement	  plant	  (supplying	  the	  firm	  with	  
electricity	  at	  a	  subsidised	  rate).	  Dangote	  plans	  to	  build	  three	  other	  cement	  plants	  in	  
Tanzania.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  Investment	  Centre	  (TIC),	  Juliet	  Kairuki,	  was	  replaced	  
after	  this	  event	  for	  corruption	  allegations	  (East	  African,	  2016	  and	  2016b).	  
The	  cement	  industry	  will	  play	  an	  increasing	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years,	  given	  the	  
potential	  boost	  that	  cheap	  cement	  can	  give	  to	  the	  construction	  and	  infrastructure	  sectors.	  In	  
fact,	  another	  example	  of	  the	  industrial	  policy	  approach	  embraced	  by	  Magufuli	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  infrastructure	  building.	  In	  January	  2017,	  Magufuli	  engaged	  with	  the	  Turkish	  
government	  and	  managed	  to	  get	  a	  concessional	  loan	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  400	  kilometre-­‐
stretch	  of	  the	  envisaged	  1,200	  kilometre	  standard-­‐gauge	  central	  railway,	  from	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  
to	  Mwanza.	  Magufuli	  also	  pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  fact,	  a	  Turkish	  company	  was	  among	  the	  
shortlisted	  contractors	  for	  this	  stretch.	  Interestingly,	  with	  this	  decision,	  Magufuli	  overturned	  
the	  original	  agreement	  reached	  with	  the	  Chinese	  Export-­‐Import	  (Exim)	  Bank.	  Exim	  Bank	  had	  
agreed	  to	  provide	  Tanzania	  with	  a	  $US	  7.6bn	  loan	  to	  build	  the	  entire	  standard-­‐gauge	  railway.	  
A	  consortium	  of	  Chinese	  companies	  appeared	  to	  have	  won	  the	  entire	  procurement	  contract.	  
Magufuli	  raised	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  original	  deal	  with	  Exim	  and	  the	  Chinese	  
consortium,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  government	  officers	  are	  now	  facing	  abuse	  of	  office	  charges	  
over	  the	  claims	  (Citizen,	  2017).	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  Magufuli	  is	  now	  intending	  to	  contract	  with	  
different	  companies	  for	  different	  stretches	  of	  the	  railway	  and,	  in	  this	  way,	  to	  introduce	  some	  
competition	  among	  the	  bidders.	  	  
Finally,	  Magufuli	  has	  gained	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  East	  African	  Community,	  where	  the	  political	  
and	  economic	  relationships	  between	  Uganda,	  Rwanda,	  Kenya,	  Burundi	  and	  Tanzania	  have	  
been	  evolving	  in	  his	  favour	  (Cooksey,	  2016).	  In	  March	  2016	  Tanzania	  and	  Uganda	  had	  
already	  agreed	  to	  build	  a	  $4	  billion	  pipeline	  to	  transport	  crude	  oil	  from	  Kabale	  in	  Uganda,	  to	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Tanga	  Port	  in	  Tanzania’s	  Indian	  Ocean	  coast.	  In	  May	  2016,	  building	  on	  his	  personal	  
relationships	  with	  Rwanda’s	  President	  Paul	  Kagame,	  Magufuli	  managed	  to	  change	  the	  
original	  plan	  agreed	  in	  2013	  in	  favour	  of	  Tanzania	  (against	  Kenya).	  The	  new	  Dar	  es	  Salaam-­‐
Isaka-­‐Kigali/Keza-­‐Musongati	  (DIKKM)	  standard	  gauge	  railway	  (SGR)	  project	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  
completed	  by	  March	  2018	  (total	  cost	  $5.2	  billion).	  Finally,	  the	  forced	  movement	  of	  the	  
government	  to	  Dodoma	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  2017,	  will	  open	  opportunities	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  construction	  industry	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  African	  capitalists.	  	  
3.6. Tanzania	  Political	  Settlement	  evolution	  and	  scenario	  
analysis	  
Changes	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  Magufuli	  and	  CCM	  (institutionalisation	  of	  power),	  and	  
between	  Magufuli	  and	  the	  private	  sector)	  disciplining	  of	  rents	  via	  deals	  making),	  reveal	  
Magufuli’s	  aspiration	  to	  construct	  a	  developmental	  state	  coalition	  and	  his	  pragmatic	  
approach.	  However,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  which	  could	  undermine	  his	  efforts	  and	  
lead	  to	  different	  trajectories	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement.	  	  
Figure	  14	  provides	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania	  since	  
its	  independence	  in	  1961.	  It	  also	  shows	  the	  current	  configuration	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  
settlement	  under	  Magufuli.	  In	  particular,	  it	  shows	  the	  two	  main	  phases	  characterising	  
Magufuli’s	  presidency,	  from	  November	  2015	  to	  March	  2017.	  Starting	  from	  this	  framework,	  
and	  our	  political	  settlement	  analysis,	  we	  can	  identify	  four	  main	  potential	  future	  scenarios	  
and	  assign	  to	  them	  different	  probabilities.	  These	  probabilities	  depend	  on	  a	  number	  of	  
factors,	  which	  we	  discuss	  below.	  	  
Scenario	  1:	  Vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  (scenario,	  35%)	  
Under	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency	  the	  political	  settlement	  becomes	  
increasingly	  authoritarian	  and	  the	  repression	  of	  the	  opposition	  increases	  in	  preparation	  of	  
the	  2020	  presidential	  elections.	  While	  excluded	  factions	  retain	  some	  form	  of	  
power/resistance	  to	  authoritarianism,	  they	  fail	  to	  organise	  an	  effective	  response	  to	  
Magufuli.	  However,	  Magufuli	  finds	  himself	  unable	  to	  develop	  his	  industrialisation	  plan,	  and	  
does	  not	  manage	  to	  deliver	  sufficient	  results	  to	  win	  an	  open	  presidential	  election,	  thus,	  he	  
has	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  over	  the	  excluded	  factions,	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  CCM.	  
Scenario	  2:	  Competitive	  clientelism	  with	  Magufuli	  as	  CCM	  presidential	  candidate	  (scenario,	  
35%)	  
Under	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency,	  the	  political	  settlement	  shifts	  back	  to	  a	  
more	  competitive	  clientelistic	  settlement,	  while	  both	  the	  oppositions	  and	  internal	  lower	  
factions	  within	  CCM	  increase	  their	  power.	  Despite	  the	  mounting	  discontent	  within	  the	  CCM	  
apparatus,	  Magufuli	  is	  able	  to	  run	  as	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  CCM.	  Lowassa	  has	  already	  
announced	  his	  willingness	  to	  run	  as	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  CHADEMA	  in	  2020.	  The	  
elections	  could	  see	  a	  strong	  opposition	  challenging	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  potentially	  
overturning	  it,	  especially	  if	  CCM	  internal	  lower	  internal	  factions	  reach	  a	  critical	  level	  of	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fragmentation.	  Given	  Lowassa’s	  health	  conditions	  and	  age,	  a	  trusted	  person	  with	  a	  strong	  
business	  network	  could	  take	  his	  position,	  in	  case	  Lowassa’s	  candidature	  were	  to	  be	  
perceived	  as	  weak.	  
Scenario	  3:	  Potential	  developmental	  coalition	  (scenario,	  25%)	  
Under	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  Magufuli’s	  presidency,	  the	  institutionalised	  control	  of	  power	  
allows	  Magufuli	  to	  exercise	  control	  of	  the	  lower	  level	  factions	  within	  CCM,	  and	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  industrialisation	  agenda	  starts	  delivering	  some	  tangible	  results.	  
Magufuli	  manages	  to	  discipline	  rents	  and	  build	  up	  a	  coalition	  with	  emerging	  powerful	  and	  
productive	  organisations.	  The	  opposition	  fragments	  and	  becomes	  weaker.	  
Scenario	  4:	  Competitive	  clientelism	  with	  new	  CCM	  presidential	  candidate	  (scenario,	  5%)	  
Magufuli	  finds	  himself	  unable	  to	  develop	  his	  industrialisation	  plan,	  and	  does	  not	  manage	  to	  
deliver	  sufficient	  results.	  New	  lower	  level	  factions	  within	  CCM	  emerge	  and	  become	  so	  
powerful	  that	  Magufuli	  is	  not	  reconfirmed	  as	  CCM	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  2020.	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  arrives	  to	  the	  2020	  election	  weak	  and	  fragmented.	  Given	  the	  
extreme	  power	  that	  the	  constitution	  assigns	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  presidency	  (including	  
the	  support	  of	  the	  military	  and	  intelligence)	  this	  is	  a	  very	  unlikely	  scenario.	  
Figure	  15:	  Change	  and	  persistence	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  political	  settlement	  since	  independence	  
	  
Source:	  Author	  
Five	  main	  factors	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  will	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  Magufuli’s	  presidency	  and	  the	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First,	  the	  fact	  that	  Magufuli’s	  aspiration	  is	  not	  fully	  articulated	  within	  a	  clear	  strategy.	  As	  
already	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  influential	  Tanzanian	  economist	  Sam	  Wangwe	  “the	  integration	  of	  
all	  these	  policies	  in	  a	  common	  national	  framework	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  ensured”	  
(Citizen,	  4	  May).	  The	  Second	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan	  (FYDP	  2016-­‐2022)	  was	  launched	  in	  
June	  2016,	  although	  its	  implementation	  has	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  expected.	  	  
Second,	  despite	  the	  shift	  towards	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  approach	  in	  building	  coalitions	  for	  
industrial	  development,	  the	  dialogue	  between	  Magufuli	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  might	  remain	  
problematic.	  In	  December	  2016	  the	  CEO	  Roundtable’s	  open	  letter	  to	  the	  president	  stressed	  
six	  main	  problems:	  (i)	  the	  destabilisation	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  (CRDB	  Bank,	  Tanzania	  largest	  
bank	  reported	  Sh	  1.9	  billion	  losses	  due	  to	  non-­‐performing	  loans);	  (ii)	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  
private	  sector	  from	  the	  government	  policy	  making	  process	  (especially	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
5YDP);	  (iii)	  the	  energy	  crisis;	  (iv)	  the	  exclusion	  from	  negotiations	  on	  the	  Economic	  
Partnership	  Agreement	  with	  the	  European	  Union;	  (v)	  exclusion	  from	  the	  dialogue	  on	  land	  
policy	  reforms;	  (vi)	  the	  mandatory	  requirement	  for	  telecom	  companies	  to	  list	  in	  the	  DSE.	  	  
Third,	  CCM	  is	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  transition,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  credible	  plan	  for	  generating	  party	  
income	  for	  the	  next	  election	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  factions,	  and	  again	  a	  
fragmentation	  within	  the	  ruling	  coalition,	  with	  the	  lower	  level	  factions	  increasing	  their	  power.	  
Magufuli’s	  austerity	  measures	  within	  public	  offices	  introduces	  a	  related	  element	  of	  fragility.	  
Many	  civil	  servants	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  CCM	  party	  machinery.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  CCM	  
machinery	  remains	  the	  most	  critical	  competitive	  advantage	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  at	  the	  
election.	  The	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  and	  the	  cut	  to	  public	  office	  expenditures	  will	  certainly	  
affect	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  civil	  servants’	  apparatus,	  who	  traditionally	  receive	  low	  pay.	  	  
Fourth,	  with	  the	  unprecedented	  movement	  of	  Lowassa	  to	  the	  opposition,	  CHADEMA	  has	  
strengthened	  significantly,	  despite	  Magufuli’s	  repression	  of	  the	  oppositions.	  Lowassa	  has	  
brought	  to	  the	  opposition	  camp	  a	  critical	  amount	  of	  “relational	  capital”,	  which	  could	  be	  
mobilised	  during	  the	  elections.	  	  
Finally,	  despite	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives	  delivering	  some	  results,	  his	  “vertical”	  
approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  has	  already	  faced	  a	  number	  of	  limitations.	  The	  need	  for	  
incremental	  and	  sector	  specific	  interventions	  is	  made	  evident	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  cutting	  heads	  
has	  not	  had	  any	  impact	  on	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  pyramidal	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  
ruling	  coalition.	  Central	  corruption	  nodes	  have	  retained	  their	  power	  and	  will	  resist	  changes,	  
affecting	  the	  developmental	  outcome	  of	  Magufuli’s	  government.	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4. Anti-­‐corruption	  framework	  and	  
corruption	  evidence	  in	  Tanzania.	  
4.1. The	  legal	  and	  institutional	  anti-­‐corruption	  framework	  
Tanzania	  has	  developed	  its	  legal	  and	  institutional	  anti-­‐corruption	  framework	  since	  1971,	  when	  
the	  Prevention	  of	  Corruption	  Act	  was	  introduced.	  The	  Act	  was	  amended	  in	  2002	  and	  again	  
revised	  in	  2007	  to	  become	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Combating	  of	  Corruption	  Act	  (PCCA).	  With	  the	  
2007	  revision	  of	  the	  act	  Tanzania	  ratified	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  against	  Corruption	  
(UNCAC)	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  Convention	  on	  Preventing	  and	  Combating	  Corruption	  
(AUCPCC).	  Within	  the	  PCCA	  legal	  framework,	  corruption	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  economic	  offence,	  
and	  provision	  exists	  for	  imprisonment,	  with	  no	  financial	  penalties	  for	  economic	  crimes	  except	  
for	  the	  recovery	  of	  assets.	  The	  legal	  framework	  is	  also	  complemented	  by	  a	  number	  of	  other	  
specific	  acts,	  mainly	  created	  under	  the	  Mkapa	  presidency	  (1995-­‐2005).	  They	  are:	  the	  1995	  
Public	  Leadership	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  Act	  (amended	  in	  2001);	  the	  2001	  Public	  Finance	  Act;	  the	  2002	  
Public	  Service	  Act;	  the	  2004	  Public	  Procurement	  Act;	  the	  2006	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Act	  
(amended	  in	  2012);	  the	  2008	  Public	  Audit	  Act;	  finally,	  the	  2010	  Elections	  Expenses	  Act.	  
Tanzania's	  first	  anti-­‐corruption	  agency	  dates	  back	  to	  1971,	  when	  Act	  No.	  16	  mandated	  the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Squad,	  which	  came	  into	  existence	  in	  1975	  (Government	  
Notice	  No.	  17	  of	  1975).	  The	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Squad	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  the	  Prevention	  of	  
Corruption	  Bureau	  (PCB)	  in	  1991,	  and	  the	  organisation	  was	  placed	  de	  jure	  under	  the	  
President	  of	  the	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania	  (URT).	  Finally,	  under	  the	  new	  PCCA	  legal	  
framework,	  in	  2007	  the	  PCB	  was	  renamed	  as	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Combating	  of	  Corruption	  
Bureau	  (PCCB).	  The	  PCCB	  is	  an	  independent	  body	  under	  Section	  5	  of	  the	  PCCA.	  The	  director	  
general	  and	  the	  deputy	  director	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  president.	  The	  mandate	  of	  the	  PCCB	  is	  
to	  raise	  awareness	  and	  guide	  government	  on	  anti-­‐corruption	  issues	  as	  well	  as	  arrest,	  
investigate,	  initiate	  proceedings,	  and	  prosecute	  cases	  of	  corruption,	  but	  only	  with	  the	  
permission	  of	  the	  director	  of	  public	  prosecutions.	  The	  mandate	  of	  the	  PCCB	  applies	  only	  to	  
mainland	  Tanzania.	  In	  Zanzibar,	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  are	  led	  by	  the	  Zanzibar	  Anti-­‐
Corruption	  and	  Economy	  Crimes	  Agency.	  	  
A	  number	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives	  are	  also	  conducted	  outside	  PCCB.	  First,	  the	  Controller	  
and	  Auditor	  General	  (CAG)	  is	  responsible	  for	  auditing	  ministries,	  departments,	  central	  and	  
local	  government,	  government-­‐owned	  corporations,	  institutes	  and	  public	  agencies.	  Second,	  
the	  Public	  Procurement	  Regulatory	  Authority	  (PPRA)	  and	  the	  related	  Public	  Procurement	  
Appeals	  Authority	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  “application	  of	  fair,	  competitive,	  transparent,	  and	  
non-­‐discriminatory	  and	  value	  for	  money	  procurement	  standards	  and	  practices”.	  The	  PPRA	  
reports	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance.	  Third,	  the	  Ethics	  Commission	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  implementing	  
the	  Leadership	  Code	  of	  Ethics,	  including	  the	  mandatory	  collection	  of	  annual	  reports	  on	  the	  
assets	  of	  government	  members.	  Finally,	  the	  Commission	  for	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Good	  
Governance	  (CHRGG)	  can	  collect	  citizens’	  complaints	  and	  start	  investigations	  (with	  the	  only	  
exception	  of	  the	  President’s	  office).	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Against	  this	  legal	  and	  institutional	  framework,	  the	  1996	  Report	  of	  the	  Warioba-­‐led	  
Commission	  against	  Corruption	  established	  by	  President	  Mukapa	  (see	  section	  3)	  laid	  the	  
foundation	  for	  two	  rounds	  of	  national	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies13.	  The	  first	  National	  Anti-­‐
Corruption	  Strategy	  and	  Action	  Plan	  (NACSAP	  I)	  was	  implemented	  from	  2000-­‐2005,	  and	  led	  
to	  the	  establishment	  of	  PCCB	  offices	  in	  all	  districts,	  alongside	  strengthening	  other	  
institutions.	  The	  following	  NASCAP	  II	  (2006-­‐2010)	  was	  articulated	  around	  eight	  components:	  
(i)	  combat	  corruption	  by	  addressing	  its	  root	  causes;	  (ii)	  strengthen	  anti-­‐corruption	  
mechanism	  at	  all	  Ministries,	  Departments	  and	  Agencies;	  (iii)	  introduce	  systems	  of	  integrity	  
accountability	  and	  transparency	  in	  Local	  Government	  Administration	  (LGA);	  (iv)	  mainstream	  
and	  empower	  private	  sector	  into	  anti-­‐corruption	  activities;	  (v)	  mainstream	  and	  empower	  
civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  into	  anti-­‐corruption	  processes;	  (vi)	  raise	  
awareness	  of	  anti-­‐corruption;	  (vii)	  build	  synergy	  between	  NACAP	  and	  Legislative,	  Judiciary	  
Integrity	  Programmes;	  and,	  (viii)	  enhance	  the	  capacity	  of	  PCCB,	  GGCU,	  and	  the	  Director	  of	  
Public	  Prosecution	  to	  deal	  with	  corruption,	  and	  to	  manage	  and	  implement	  NASCAP	  
(Mukukuta	  Report,	  2010:	  97).	  	  
Starting	  from	  1998	  Tanzania	  has	  also	  implemented	  a	  multi-­‐phased	  reform	  –	  Public	  Financial	  
Management	  Reform	  Programme	  (PFMRP)	  –	  aimed	  at	  attaining	  sound	  financial	  
management	  and	  discipline	  in	  public	  service	  delivery,	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  financial	  
accountability	  and	  transparency.	  In	  particular,	  during	  its	  first	  phase	  (1998-­‐2004)	  PFMRP	  I	  
focused	  on	  minimizing	  resource	  leakage,	  strengthening	  financial	  control	  and	  enhancing	  
accountability	  by	  reforming	  budget	  process	  and	  introducing	  an	  Integrated	  Financial	  
Management	  System	  (IFMS).	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  number	  of	  tools,	  such	  as	  a	  cash	  budget	  
and	  centralised	  payment	  system,	  public	  expenditure	  reviews,	  expenditure	  tracking	  systems,	  
delivered	  significant	  results	  by	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  bureaucratic	  corruption.	  	  
4.2. Corruption	  evidence	  and	  types	  of	  corruption	  
Despite	  its	  legal	  and	  institutional	  framework,	  and	  implemented	  reforms,	  corruption	  has	  
remained	  a	  permanent	  feature	  in	  the	  development	  history	  of	  Tanzania,	  and	  has	  been	  one	  of	  
the	  major	  forces	  driving	  changes	  in	  its	  political	  settlement	  (see	  section	  3).	  In	  particular,	  as	  
stressed	  by	  Hazel	  Gray	  (2015:3):	  “[t]he	  persistence	  of	  grand	  corruption	  in	  public	  finance	  
despite	  these	  reforms	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  technical	  improvements	  in	  the	  budgeting	  
process	  did	  little	  to	  address	  the	  underlying	  drivers	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  Tanzania”.	  
Moreover,	  while	  many	  corruption	  processes	  in	  public	  finance	  and	  rents	  capture	  occur	  within	  
the	  official	  government	  budget,	  there	  are	  also	  off-­‐budget	  transfers	  and	  rents	  distribution.	  In	  
Tanzania	  off-­‐budget	  expenditures	  “took	  the	  form	  of	  covert	  and	  illegal	  payments	  that	  were	  
officially	  ignored	  or	  denied”,	  including	  both	  forms	  of	  petty	  corruption,	  and	  grand	  corruption	  
at	  higher	  levels	  of	  the	  pyramidal	  organisational	  structure	  (Gray,	  2015:3).	  
	  
13	  Among	  its	  main	  recommendations,	  the	  Warioba	  Report	  stated:	  “The	  fight	  against	  corruption	  is	  everyone’s	  responsibility	  and	  
especially	  leaders.	  Every	  leader	  must	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  clean	  before	  the	  people;	  he	  should	  be	  seen	  to	  take	  stern	  measures	  against	  
all	  corrupt	  elements	  in	  his	  area	  of	  leadership;	  and	  if	  he	  cannot	  do	  so,	  he	  should	  resign	  even	  if	  he	  himself	  is	  not	  accused	  of	  being	  
corrupt.	  The	  struggle	  against	  corruption	  should	  not	  be	  left	  to	  the	  President	  alone.”	  (Warioba	  report	  summary)	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The	  following	  table	  2	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  incidences	  of	  corruption	  reported	  in	  
Tanzania	  to	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  authority.	  Between	  1995	  and	  2012	  PCCB	  received	  51,964	  
allegations.	  Since	  the	  new	  legal	  Act	  (PCCA	  2007),	  however,	  only	  4.9	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  reported	  
cases	  were	  filed	  in	  court	  (the	  number	  of	  convictions	  against	  corrupt	  offenders	  since	  1995	  
was	  less	  than	  one	  per	  cent	  of	  cases	  reported).	  Moreover,	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  recovered	  
assets	  is	  relatively	  limited.	  The	  most	  important	  feature	  here,	  however,	  is	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  
heterogeneity	  among	  the	  reported	  cases.	  




























































































































1995	   261	   261	   145	   -­‐	   -­‐	   8	   16	   1	   7	   2,706,800,000/=	  
1996	   513	   513	   245	   -­‐	   -­‐	   21	   34	   2	   9	   1,900,651,000/=	  
1997	   510	   510	   289	   -­‐	   -­‐	   9	   18	   1	   4	   6,932,950,000/=	  
1998	   545	   545	   200	   -­‐	   95	   15	   31	   2	   6	   9,300,478,000/=	  
1999	   1116	   1116	   304	   -­‐	   209	   62	   47	   9	   25	   14,795,169,650/=	  
2000	   1244	   1244	   276	   -­‐	   234	   49	   42	   6	   3	   11,100,000,000/=	  
2001	   1354	   1354	   285	   1	   154	   57	   53	   -­‐	   -­‐	   2,500,000,000/=	  
2002	   1383	   1383	   732	   42	   222	   52	   191	   12	   12	   2,714,199,000/=	  
2003	   2285	   1796	   540	   21	   36	   51	   178	   9	   28	   3,800,266,000/=	  
2004	   2223	   1149	   458	   126	   25	   60	   202	   6	   8	   4,000,216,000/=	  
2005	   3121	   677	   540	   111	   2	   50	   218	   6	   10	   2,500,600,000/=	  
2006	   6320	   1528	   1688	   209	   496	   71	   251	   18	   28	   1,301,492,528/=	  
2007	   8235	   1266	   2015	   280	   460	   196	   352	   35	   45	   1,580,099,081/=	  
2008	   6137	   928	   936	   74	   184	   147	   416	   37	   71	   13,203,459,357/=	  
2009	   5930	   884	   1175	   40	   152	   222	   463	   46	   73	   436,132,336/=	  
2010	   5685	   870	   924	   29	   135	   224	   587	   64	   98	   10,123,258,300/=	  
2011	   4765	   819	   773	   30	   84	   193	   466	   52	   61	   4,638,939,558/=	  
2012	  (Jan)	   337	   39	   386	   1	   4	   25	   30	   2	   2	   3,641,854/=	  
TOTAL	   51964	   16882	   11911	   964	   2492	   1512	   3595	   308	   490	   93538352664	  
Source:	  PCCB/HQ,	  Feb	  2012;	  APRM,	  2013.	  
The	  evidence	  on	  corruption	  in	  Tanzania	  points	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  multiple	  types	  of	  
corruption,	  involving	  different	  sectors	  and	  activities	  in	  the	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  multiple	  deep-­‐
rooted,	  sometimes	  overlapping,	  clientelistic	  networks.	  Khan	  (2006)	  develops	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  
four	  main	  types	  of	  corruption,	  which	  makes	  the	  high	  level	  of	  corruption	  heterogeneity	  
tractable,	  both	  from	  an	  analytical	  and	  policy	  point	  of	  view.	  Khan	  introduces	  a	  distinction	  
between:	  (i)	  market	  restriction-­‐driven	  corruption;	  (ii)	  state	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption;	  (iii)	  
political	  corruption;	  and,	  (iv)	  predatory	  corruption.	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Building	  on	  this	  analytical	  distinction,	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Tanzania	  has	  been	  affected	  
by	  both	  state	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  and	  market	  restriction-­‐driven	  corruption	  (since	  its	  
independence),	  and	  increasingly	  by	  political	  corruption	  (since	  the	  privatisation	  and	  
liberalisation	  of	  the	  economy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  clientelistic	  competitive	  
settlement	  under	  the	  Kikwete	  presidency,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3).	  Predatory	  corruption	  
has	  been	  almost	  absent	  in	  Tanzania	  throughout	  its	  post-­‐independence	  history,	  as	  the	  
political	  settlement	  never	  reached	  high	  level	  of	  violence,	  and	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  managed	  to	  
contain	  the	  rising	  tensions.	  	  
The	  following	  corruption	  cases	  provides	  evidence	  of	  these	  different	  types	  of	  corruption,	  also	  
showing	  the	  potential	  co-­‐existence	  of	  more	  than	  one	  type	  of	  corruption	  within	  the	  same	  
case.	  In	  particular,	  a	  number	  of	  state	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  cases	  has	  turned	  into	  
political	  corruption	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Moreover,	  given	  the	  economic	  policy	  regime	  in	  
Tanzania	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  public	  authorities	  “specialised”	  in	  resource	  extractions,	  
market-­‐restriction	  driven	  corruption	  has	  been	  pretty	  common	  in	  sectors	  and	  activities	  
related	  to	  trade/ports,	  land	  rights,	  certification	  and	  licencing	  (TPSF,	  2017).	  This	  type	  of	  
corruption	  has	  developed	  alongside	  widespread	  state	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  and	  
political	  corruption.	  
Case	  1:	  The	  External	  Payments	  Arrears	  (EPA)	  scandal,	  2005	  (Mkapa/Kikwete	  presidency)	  
The	  EPA	  account	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  Tanzania	  (BOT)	  was	  originally	  introduced	  to	  help	  service	  
balance	  of	  payment.	  Local	  importers	  would	  pay	  into	  the	  EPA	  account	  in	  shillings,	  foreign	  
companies	  would	  then	  be	  paid	  by	  BOT	  in	  foreign	  currency.	  Following	  an	  independent	  audit,	  
Ernst	  and	  Young	  found	  a	  number	  of	  ‘dubious	  payments’	  to	  22	  local	  companies	  for	  a	  total	  
amount	  of	  TShs	  131	  billion.	  The	  BOT	  Governor	  Daudi	  Balali	  had	  authorised	  the	  payments	  and	  
was	  then	  forced	  to	  resign.	  In	  2008	  Beno	  Ndulu	  became	  the	  new	  governor	  (reconfirmed	  
under	  Magufuli).	  The	  local	  companies	  who	  had	  received	  the	  money	  were	  owned	  by	  
prominent	  businessmen	  and	  some	  senior	  members	  of	  CCM.	  By	  2008,	  following	  on	  from	  
Kikwete’s	  ultimatum/amnesty,	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  money	  was	  repaid,	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  the	  major	  recipient	  company	  (Kagoda	  Agriculture	  Ltd)	  with	  alleged	  strong	  links	  
with	  CCM.	  The	  director	  of	  the	  company	  was	  later	  arrested.	  As	  reported	  in	  Cooksey	  (2011),	  it	  
is	  widely	  believed	  that	  the	  money	  was	  used	  to	  finance	  the	  CCM	  election	  campaign	  in	  2005.	  
Case	  2:	  The	  Bank	  of	  Tanzania	  Twin	  Towers	  scandal,	  2006	  (Mkapa/Kikwete	  presidency)	  
In	  2006	  the	  Bank	  of	  Tanzania	  (BOT)	  was	  investigated	  for	  their	  enormous	  spending	  on	  the	  
construction	  of	  the	  BOT	  Twin	  Towers	  (a	  17-­‐storey	  main	  office	  building).	  The	  cost	  of	  the	  
project	  increased	  from	  $37	  million	  in	  1997,	  to	  $70	  million	  in	  2000	  and	  finally	  $345	  million	  at	  
completion.	  The	  construction	  was	  done	  by	  the	  Group	  Five	  Ltd,	  a	  South	  African	  construction	  
firm	  owned	  partially	  by	  South	  African	  tycoon	  Tokyo	  Sexwale.	  The	  Director	  of	  Personnel	  and	  
Administration	  and	  the	  Twin	  Towers	  project	  manager	  were	  accused	  of	  causing	  a	  loss	  of	  more	  
than	  $170	  million.	  The	  BOT	  Board	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  failed	  to	  protect	  public	  interest.	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Case	  3:	  The	  Richmond/Dowans	  scandal,	  2006	  (Kikwete	  presidency)	  
In	  2005	  TANESCO	  advertised	  a	  tender	  for	  a	  100MW	  emergency	  power	  plant	  to	  convert	  gas	  
from	  Songo	  Songo.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  the	  bidding	  companies	  were	  found	  unsuitable,	  
both	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  capability	  and	  financial	  surety,	  Prime	  Minister	  Lowassa	  intervened	  and	  
awarded	  the	  contract	  to	  the	  Richmond	  Development	  Company	  LLC.	  This	  company	  had	  
already	  a	  poor	  track-­‐record	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  pipeline	  from	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  to	  Mwanza.	  
Not	  surprisingly	  Richmond	  failed	  again,	  this	  time	  in	  securing	  financial	  backing	  for	  the	  
industrial	  operation.	  Given	  the	  energy	  crisis,	  the	  government	  directly	  backed	  Richmond.	  By	  
the	  end	  of	  2006	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  company	  was	  not	  able	  to	  deliver,	  and	  that	  there	  
were	  potential	  irregularities	  in	  the	  tendering	  process.	  As	  reported	  in	  Tanzanian	  Affairs	  
(2010),	  Richmond	  only	  invested	  $30	  million	  in	  generators	  for	  a	  total	  capacity	  of	  20MW,	  and	  
tried	  to	  obtain	  more	  than	  $115	  million.	  A	  number	  of	  investigations	  followed:	  first,	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  authority	  did	  not	  find	  any	  evidence	  of	  corruption.	  However,	  the	  Parliamentary	  
Commission	  established	  by	  Kikwete	  found	  evidence	  of	  corruption,	  to	  which	  the	  government	  
responded	  by	  exonerating	  all	  politicians	  and	  civil	  servants	  involved	  in	  the	  deal.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  
2008,	  Lowassa	  resigned	  from	  the	  government.	  Interestingly,	  in	  2009	  the	  TANESCO	  tender	  
failed	  to	  attract	  any	  serious	  bidder.	  
Case	  4:	  The	  Independent	  Power	  Tanzania	  Limited	  (IPTL),	  1995	  (Mkapa	  presidency)	  and	  the	  
Tegeta	  Escrow	  Account	  scandal,	  2014	  (Kikwete	  presidency)	  
In	  1995	  TANESCO	  signed	  a	  large	  and	  significantly	  expensive	  power	  supply	  contract	  with	  IPTL,	  a	  
joint	  venture	  between	  Mechmar	  Corporation	  of	  Malaysia	  (70%)	  and	  VIPEM	  of	  Tanzania	  (30%).	  
Since	  then,	  a	  number	  of	  investigations	  on	  the	  tendering	  process	  have	  been	  conducted	  and	  the	  
case	  ended	  in	  front	  of	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID).	  
The	  charges	  of	  corruption	  were	  finally	  dropped	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  ICSID	  due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  government	  to	  provide	  substantial	  evidence	  in	  time.	  However,	  in	  2014	  further	  allegations	  
of	  corruption	  involving	  IPTL	  and	  an	  escrow	  account	  emerged.	  The	  Public	  Accounts	  Committee	  
pointed	  to	  fraudulent	  payments	  linking	  TANESCO	  to	  the	  energy	  firm	  and	  a	  number	  of	  CCM	  
politicians.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  Mizengo	  Pinda	  was	  pressured	  to	  resign.	  	  
Case	  5:	  The	  Stanbic/Standard	  Bank	  scandal,	  2015	  (Kikwete/Magufuli	  presidency)	  
In	  2012	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  borrowed	  $600	  million	  through	  Stanbic	  Bank	  (subsidiary	  of	  
Standard	  Bank).	  The	  private	  placement	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  was	  related	  to	  the	  government’s	  
five-­‐year	  development	  plan	  and	  the	  need	  to	  finance	  electricity,	  water	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  
work	  in	  Tanzania.	  In	  November	  2015	  the	  bank	  agreed	  to	  pay	  $	  36.2	  million	  in	  fines	  and	  
repayments	  of	  bribes	  and	  profits	  for	  an	  alleged	  bribery	  scandal	  in	  Tanzania.	  Apparently,	  the	  
originally	  agreed	  fees	  were	  raised	  from	  1.4%	  to	  2.4%	  and	  the	  difference	  was	  transferred	  to	  a	  
local	  Tanzanian	  company	  called	  EGMA.	  The	  chairman	  of	  the	  company	  was	  Harry	  Kitilya,	  former	  
Stanbic	  Bank	  employee,	  but	  more	  critically	  TRA’s	  Commissioner	  General	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
deal.	  In	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  Kikwete	  time,	  Magufuli	  immediately	  ordered	  the	  arrest	  of	  Kitilya	  
who	  is	  currently	  facing	  corruption	  charges.	  Moreover,	  two	  weeks	  after,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  
the	  PCCB,	  Edward	  Hoseah,	  was	  removed	  and	  replaced	  by	  Valentino	  Mlowola,	  a	  career	  
policeman	  who	  had	  risen	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Director	  of	  Criminal	  Intelligence.	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According	  to	  the	  Afrobarometer	  (see	  figures	  16	  and	  17	  below),	  66	  percent	  of	  Tanzanians	  
think	  that,	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  cases	  of	  petty	  and	  grand	  corruption	  have	  increased	  a	  lot	  ,	  
while	  15	  percent	  believe	  they	  have	  remained	  at	  similar	  levels.	  Only	  13	  percent	  perceive	  a	  
reduction	  in	  corruption.	  More	  critically,	  the	  perceived	  performance	  of	  the	  government	  in	  
fighting	  corruption	  has	  been	  increasingly	  bad	  between	  2005	  and	  2014.	  
	  
Figure	  16:	  Perceived	  change	  in	  level	  of	  
corruption	  in	  Tanzania,	  2014	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Aiko	  (2015)	  
Figure	  17:	  Popular	  evaluation	  of	  
government’s	  performance	  in	  fighting	  
corruption	  
	  
As	  documented	  in	  section	  3,	  since	  his	  electoral	  campaign	  Magufuli’s	  presidential	  and	  
government	  agenda	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  crusade.	  In	  fact,	  Magufuli’s	  
anti-­‐corruption	  approach	  reflects	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  and,	  
thus,	  the	  current	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania.	  The	  delivery	  of	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  agenda	  
has	  mainly	  relied	  on	  the	  following	  three	  set	  of	  strategies:	  
• Rule	  by	  fear:	  blaming	  and	  shaming	  allegedly	  corrupted	  people	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  
private	  sector	  and	  direct	  involvement	  in	  anti-­‐corruption	  operations,	  backed	  by	  the	  police	  
and	  the	  intelligence.	  
• Punishment:	  removing	  people	  from	  key	  positions	  in	  public	  offices	  and	  authorities,	  and	  
prosecution	  enforcement	  (also	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ultimatums	  and	  amnesty	  agreements).	  
• Centralisation:	  Reducing	  potential	  leakages	  and	  rents	  capture	  from	  the	  centre	  to	  the	  
regions/districts	  by	  direct	  allocation	  of	  resources	  (e.g.	  fertilizers,	  education)	  and	  
centralisation	  in	  the	  President’s	  Office	  of	  rents	  allocation	  functions	  (e.g.	  sugar	  import	  
licence).	  
While	  the	  evidence	  is	  still	  scattered,	  Magufuli’s	  systemic	  strategies	  may	  have	  achieved	  some	  
results.	  However,	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  concern	  about	  the	  sustainability	  of	  these	  strategies	  
(and	  achieved	  results)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  terms	  of	  development	  outcomes.	  The	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main	  reason	  for	  these	  concerns	  is	  that	  Magufuli’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  mainly	  attacking	  
the	  manifestations	  of	  a	  much	  more	  diffused	  and	  diversified	  set	  of	  corruption	  processes,	  
unfolding	  in	  different	  sectors	  and	  activities,	  as	  well	  as	  involving	  different	  clientelistic	  
networks	  and	  powerful	  organisations.	  	  
Without	  addressing	  the	  specific	  types	  of	  corruption	  processes	  and	  rents	  capture	  
mechanisms	  entrenched	  in	  the	  current	  political	  settlement	  and	  economic	  structure,	  the	  
replacement	  of	  public	  officials	  or	  their	  punishment	  does	  not	  automatically	  lead	  to	  any	  
development	  outcome.	  If	  these	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  do	  not	  start	  delivering	  better	  
development	  outcomes,	  for	  example	  a	  diffused	  improvement	  of	  service	  delivery	  in	  
education	  and	  health	  or	  incremental	  improvements	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents	  for	  
productive	  investments,	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  will	  soon	  face	  increasing	  resistance.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  possibility	  of	  transitioning	  from	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  towards	  a	  
potential	  developmental	  coalition	  will	  depend	  critically	  on	  the	  combination	  of	  systemic	  
interventions	  with	  sector-­‐specific	  incremental	  strategies.	  The	  identification	  and	  
implementation	  of	  sector-­‐specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  that	  are	  feasible	  in	  the	  existing	  
political	  settlement,	  and	  that	  are	  able	  to	  deliver	  significant	  incremental	  improvements	  in	  
development	  outcomes	  –	  high	  impact	  (Khan	  et	  al,	  2017)	  -­‐	  would	  address	  the	  shortcomings	  
of	  the	  existing	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  in	  Tanzania,	  ultimately	  improving	  their	  effectiveness	  
and	  sustainability14.	  
	   	  
	  
14This	  approach	  resonates	  with	  Mufuruki’s	  statement	  that	  “the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  must	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  
innovative	  efforts	  to	  provide	  jobs	  and	  increase	  production”	  (29th	  Annual	  Camden	  Conference	  “The	  New	  Africa”,	  Feb	  2016)	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5. Strategic	  opportunities	  for	  anti-­‐
corruption	  evidence	  (ACE)	  strategies	  in	  
Tanzania	  
The	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Evidence	  Programme	  (ACE)	  was	  created	  by	  DFID	  to	  tackle	  corruption	  
and	  lead	  to	  more	  effective,	  evidence-­‐based	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives.	  The	  programme	  will	  
fund	  research	  projects	  in	  Bangladesh	  and	  Nigeria,	  in	  addition	  to	  Tanzania.	  Our	  alternative	  
approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  looks	  for	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities,	  
in	  areas	  where	  changes	  in	  policies	  and	  interventions	  may	  be	  potentially	  supported	  by	  some	  
powerful	  players	  who	  see	  ‘horizontal	  enforcement’	  as	  being	  in	  their	  own	  interest	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  ‘vertical	  enforcement’	  by	  government	  agencies).	  Clearly	  these	  opportunities	  
have	  to	  be	  carefully	  sought	  out	  (Khan	  et	  al,	  2017).	  In	  section	  2	  we	  have	  highlighted	  how	  
Tanzania’s	  structural	  transformation	  critically	  depends	  on	  its	  capacity	  to	  address	  a	  number	  
of	  critical	  bottlenecks	  and	  constraints	  in	  the	  productive	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  political	  
settlement	  analysis	  in	  section	  3	  has	  shown	  how	  in	  assessing	  the	  feasibility	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies	  we	  will	  have	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  distribution	  of	  interests	  among	  
powerful	  organisations	  in	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents.	  In	  
these	  sectors	  there	  may	  be	  productive	  interests	  who	  may	  be	  induced	  to	  support	  more	  
productive	  strategies	  in	  their	  own	  interest,	  with	  judicious	  changes	  in	  policies,	  incentives	  or	  
the	  organization	  of	  appropriate	  collective	  action.	  
In	  our	  scoping	  studies	  we	  looked	  for	  such	  opportunities,	  keeping	  our	  analyses	  of	  economic	  
challenges	  and	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  mind.	  In	  consultation	  with	  DFID,	  other	  
development	  partners,	  our	  country	  research	  partners,	  and	  using	  our	  own	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
country	  and	  past	  research,	  we	  have	  identified	  a	  series	  of	  research	  projects	  that	  will	  aim	  to	  
rigorously	  identify	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities.	  	  The	  recent	  
reports	  (May	  2017)	  presented	  by	  the	  Tanzanian	  National	  Business	  Council	  and	  Tanzanian	  
Private	  Sector	  Foundation	  seem	  to	  validate	  the	  sectoral	  priorities	  and	  corruption	  issues	  
addressed	  within	  ACE.	  For	  example,	  the	  following	  table	  summarises	  a	  number	  of	  bottlenecks	  
inhibiting	  agricultural	  transformation	  in	  Tanzania,	  as	  they	  emerged	  from	  engagement	  with	  
50+	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  sector.	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Table	  4:	  Mapping	  of	  bottlenecks	  inhibiting	  agricultural	  transformation	  
	  
Source:	  TPSF,	  2017	  
We	  also	  took	  care	  to	  include	  projects	  in	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  sectors	  of	  development	  
activity:	  public	  goods	  and	  infrastructure,	  productive	  sectors	  and	  skills,	  health	  and	  health	  
delivery	  and	  governance	  agencies	  and	  media.	  The	  opportunities	  in	  each	  of	  these	  categories	  
were	  not	  identical	  in	  our	  three	  study	  countries	  (Bangladesh,	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania),	  and	  here	  
we	  report	  the	  types	  of	  sectoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities	  that	  we	  want	  to	  study	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Tanzania.	  Each	  of	  our	  projects	  is	  expected	  to	  generate	  evidence	  about	  feasible	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  four	  types	  defined	  by	  our	  ACE	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies	  clusters.	  These	  strategy	  clusters	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  15	  and	  
explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Khan	  et	  al.,	  (2017).	  A	  number	  of	  them	  are	  presented	  here	  to	  
highlight	  the	  research	  approach	  and	  expected	  results.	  
Under	  public	  goods	  and	  infrastructure	  we	  have	  identified	  three	  areas	  for	  evidence-­‐based	  
investigation	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities.	  Let’s	  consider	  the	  power	  sector	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  this	  first	  group	  of	  projects.	  In	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  
of	  energy	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  faced	  enormous	  challenges,	  including	  capacity	  shortages,	  lack	  of	  
private	  investments,	  and	  low	  level	  of	  reliability	  of	  the	  power	  supply.	  The	  Tanzanian	  
government	  has	  tried	  to	  remedy	  the	  situation	  by	  proposing	  several	  investments	  which	  have	  
had	  limited	  impact	  so	  far.	  This	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  structural	  problems	  affecting	  the	  
sector	  have	  not	  been	  tackled.	  First,	  the	  governance	  reform	  of	  Tanesco	  has	  proven	  extremely	  
difficult	  given	  entrenched	  interests	  in	  the	  sector.	  Second,	  long-­‐term,	  large-­‐scale	  productive	  
investments	  in	  the	  power	  generation	  have	  been	  constrained	  by	  misaligned	  incentives	  and	  
significant	  rent	  capture	  possibilities,	  while	  less	  efficient	  and	  more	  costly	  investments	  have	  
multiplied.	  	  Preliminary	  scoping	  work	  suggests	  that	  existing	  energy	  and	  procurement	  policies	  
dissuade	  high-­‐capability	  companies	  from	  entering	  the	  energy	  sector,	  expanding	  the	  existing	  
production	  capacity	  and	  investing	  in	  alternative	  sources	  of	  power	  generation.	  Policies	  that	  
discourage	  efficient	  production	  generation	  also	  create	  incentives	  for	  corruption,	  as	  less	  
capable	  but	  politically	  connected	  companies	  engage	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  expensive	  and	  
Comprehensive consultations with 50+ stakeholders in the sector 





Source: Dalberg analysis of stakeholder interviews on highest-priority issues for each organization. Dark green indicates policy issue was top of the stakeholder’s priority 
list, while yellow or orange indicates the issue was lower on the priority list or not mentioned; however issues marked yellow or orange may still be a focus area for the 
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relatively	  less	  cost-­‐efficient	  power	  plants.	  The	  study	  aims	  at	  identifying	  potential	  governance	  
reforms	  in	  Tanesco	  and	  changes	  in	  procurement	  policies	  to	  attract	  high-­‐capability	  companies	  
to	  invest	  in	  cost-­‐efficient	  energy	  production	  technologies,	  with	  targeted	  measures	  for	  
companies	  operating	  in	  export	  promotion	  zones	  (or	  similar	  industrial	  agglomerations).	  
Energy	  production	  cost	  models	  and	  analyses	  will	  be	  used	  to	  compare	  the	  cost-­‐efficiency	  of	  
different	  energy	  production	  technologies	  ,	  and	  test	  fiscally	  credible	  incentives	  and	  energy	  
pricing	  for	  producers,	  including	  access	  to	  long-­‐term	  finance	  for	  power	  production	  and	  the	  
potential	  introduction	  of	  captive	  power	  production	  plants	  (CCP)	  between	  20	  and	  50MV	  in	  
Export	  Promotion	  Zones.	  Political	  economy	  analysis	  will	  assess	  the	  feasibility	  of	  governance	  
reforms	  within	  Tanesco	  and	  between	  Tanesco	  and	  power	  production	  producers,	  including	  
historical	  players	  like	  Songas,	  as	  well	  as	  new	  investors.	  





Public	  goods	  &	  
infrastructures	  
Productive	  
sectors	  &	  skills	  









	   	   	   	   	  














	   	   	   	   	  
Notes:	  	  
1.	  Incentive	  restructuring	  strategies	  
Here,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  change	  the	  relative	  returns	  to	  activities	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  a	  connected	  
production	  or	  value	  chain	  to	  create	  support	  for	  specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives.	  	  
2.	  Strategies	  enhancing	  compliance	  by	  addressing	  differences	  in	  organisational	  interests	  	  
Here	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  address	  differences	  in	  the	  interests	  and	  capabilities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  
organisations	  to	  enable	  the	  potentially	  compliant	  to	  comply	  and	  selecting	  appropriate	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  with	  others.	  	  
3.	  Strategies	  of	  organising	  collective	  action	  	  
The	  primary	  focus	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  to	  organise	  groups	  to	  engage	  in	  effective	  collective	  action	  to	  support	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy.	  	  
4.	  Strategies	  addressing	  contested	  rights	  
Some	  corruption	  problems	  emerge	  because	  there	  are	  overlapping	  or	  contested	  rights	  and	  the	  only	  resolution	  available	  to	  the	  
contesting	  parties	  may	  be	  to	  engage	  in	  corruption	  as	  a	  way	  of	  resolving	  disputes.	  See	  Khan	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  for	  more	  details.	  	  
(T):	  projects	  that	  only	  cover	  Tanzania,	  (NT):	  comparative	  projects	  covering	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania;	  (BNT):	  cross-­‐country	  
projects	  that	  cover	  Bangladesh,	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania.	  	  
Source:	  Author	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The	  port	  and	  smuggling	  project	  will	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  areas	  of	  corruption	  in	  
Tanzania.	  Despite	  a	  number	  of	  recent	  studies	  assessing	  inefficiencies	  and	  some	  corruption	  
issues	  in	  the	  port,	  the	  evidence	  on	  corruption	  dynamics	  at	  the	  port	  remains	  scattered.	  While	  
new	  investments	  in	  the	  port	  and	  a	  reform	  of	  its	  governance	  would	  be	  critical	  to	  address	  
these	  inefficiencies	  and	  losses,	  investments	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  if	  corruption	  is	  not	  reduced.	  
The	  World	  Bank	  Report	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  corruption	  is	  “both	  a	  source	  of	  inefficiency	  
and	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  inefficiency.”	  Our	  study	  aims	  at	  addressing	  this	  corruption-­‐efficiency	  
nexus	  and	  will	  adopt	  a	  two-­‐pronged,	  mixed-­‐method	  approach.	  First,	  we	  will	  conduct	  in-­‐
depth	  rents	  mapping	  analysis	  for	  specific	  commodities	  (rice	  and	  sugar)	  to	  understand	  
smuggling	  and	  underreported	  imports.	  This	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  fine-­‐tuned	  
understanding	  of	  the	  specific	  mechanisms,	  rents	  flows	  and	  capture	  processes	  in	  the	  port.	  
Building	  on	  our	  analysis,	  we	  will	  then	  refine	  existing	  quantitative	  methodologies	  to	  estimate	  
evasion	  of	  custom	  duties	  for	  different	  categories	  of	  products,	  by	  using	  mirror	  statistics	  
techniques.	  By	  computing	  the	  mismatch	  between	  revenues	  and	  reported	  trade	  flows	  for	  a	  
number	  of	  selected	  commodities	  we	  aim	  at	  developing	  a	  tool	  for	  tracking	  improvements	  in	  
the	  functioning	  of	  the	  port	  authority.	  Finally,	  we	  will	  use	  this	  evidence	  to	  develop	  coalitions	  
among	  producers	  in	  the	  rice	  and	  sugar	  industries	  for	  collective	  action-­‐based	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies.	  Larger	  producers	  with	  more	  influence	  have	  entered	  these	  sectors	  and	  the	  
government	  has	  made	  sugar	  smuggling	  one	  of	  its	  priorities	  since	  2015.	  	  The	  evidence	  we	  
produce	  may	  help	  to	  change	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  rice	  and	  sugar	  sectors,	  in	  which	  a	  
few	  influential	  importers	  so	  far	  have	  had	  sufficient	  political	  power	  to	  generate	  substantial	  
rents	  from	  the	  import	  of	  these	  two	  important	  food	  commodities.	  
Under	  productive	  sector	  and	  skills	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  a	  number	  of	  key	  areas	  including	  skills	  
development	  and	  fertilizers	  subsidies.	  The	  shortage	  of	  technical	  skills	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  been	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  constraints	  to	  its	  industrial	  development.	  Vocational	  training	  
institutions	  are	  funded	  by	  a	  skills	  levy	  collected	  by	  the	  Tanzanian	  Revenue	  Authority.	  One	  
third	  of	  the	  skills	  levy	  is	  spend	  on	  TVET,	  while	  two	  thirds	  remain	  with	  the	  government.	  From	  
the	  ATE	  report,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  one	  of	  the	  key	  constraints	  in	  skill	  development	  is	  that	  the	  
skills	  development	  levy	  is	  not	  implemented	  nor	  distributed	  transparently.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
VETA	  remains	  severely	  underfunded,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  qualified	  teachers	  and	  training	  
infrastructure	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  key	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  education	  and	  
skills	  training.	  Moreover,	  given	  the	  dramatic	  shortage	  of	  skills,	  and	  despite	  local	  content	  
policies	  restricting	  the	  employment	  of	  foreign	  workers,	  companies	  in	  Tanzania	  have	  
increasingly	  relied	  on	  foreign	  workers	  and	  bribed	  the	  Immigration	  Agency	  to	  provide	  illegal	  
short-­‐term	  work	  permits.	  This	  corruption	  has	  a	  high	  impact	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  local	  
content	  policy,	  as	  well	  as	  possibly	  undermining	  relationships	  between	  locals	  and	  migrants.	  
The	  project	  aims	  at	  identifying	  new	  skills	  development	  models	  involving	  both	  firms	  and	  
vocational	  training	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  current	  fiscal	  costs	  and	  
incentives	  for	  skills	  development.	  The	  adoption	  of	  discreet	  choice	  experiment	  (DCE)	  
techniques	  will	  allow	  testing	  the	  feasibility	  of	  these	  different	  models	  among	  different	  
stakeholders	  and	  tailor	  different	  models	  for	  different	  sectors	  and	  firm-­‐types.	  
The	  project	  on	  fertilizers	  will	  examine	  centralised	  and	  technology-­‐enhanced	  distribution	  
modalities	  (e-­‐wallet	  and	  parastatal	  fertiliser	  company	  respectively)	  that	  have	  recently	  been	  
introduced	  into	  fertiliser	  subsidy	  programmes	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  Nigeria,	  two	  of	  the	  biggest	  in	  
Africa.	  The	  new	  distribution	  modalities	  are	  intended	  to	  reduce	  leakage	  of	  vouchers	  via	  local	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government	  administrations	  by	  bypassing	  intermediations,	  but	  they	  present	  their	  own	  
challenges.	  Our	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  these	  modalities	  will	  at	  best	  achieve	  partial	  success	  and	  
that	  they	  might	  “shift”	  leakages	  along	  the	  distribution	  chain,	  including	  triggering	  new	  
corruption	  dynamics	  involving	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  study	  will	  combine	  large-­‐scale	  
household	  surveys,	  key	  informant	  interviews	  at	  multiple	  levels,	  and	  detailed	  process	  analysis	  
of	  corruption	  -­‐	  rents	  mapping	  and	  leakages	  identification	  -­‐	  along	  the	  distribution	  chain.	  
Political	  economy	  analysis	  will	  finally	  help	  to	  frame	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  prior	  quantitative	  
and	  qualitative	  work,	  and	  assess	  the	  feasibility	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  It	  will	  be	  
amongst	  the	  first	  studies	  to	  explore	  the	  new	  modalities	  in	  both	  countries,	  and	  will	  be	  both	  
unusual	  in	  its	  detailed	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  two	  major	  programmes,	  and	  rare	  in	  its	  
combination	  of	  technical	  and	  political	  economy	  analysis	  of	  the	  distribution	  modalities.	  
Under	  the	  governance	  area,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  alignment	  of	  interests	  and	  disciplining	  of	  
rents	  in	  Export	  Processing	  Zones	  (EPZs)	  and	  Special	  Economic	  Zones	  (SEZs)	  in	  Tanzania.	  The	  
EPZs	  seek	  to	  attract	  new	  export	  oriented	  foreign	  and	  local	  investments	  to	  create	  
international	  competitiveness	  for	  export-­‐led	  economic	  growth.	  The	  SEZs	  aim	  to	  help	  to	  
transform	  Tanzania	  into	  a	  globally	  competitive	  country	  by	  accelerating	  domestic	  production,	  
promoting	  exports	  and	  generating	  employment.	  Thus,	  the	  EPZ/SEZ	  programmes	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  become	  effective	  industrial	  policy	  instruments	  for	  the	  government’s	  renewed	  
industrialisation	  efforts.	  However,	  unproductive	  rent	  seeking	  and	  corruption	  presently	  
weaken	  that	  potential.	  	  The	  research	  project	  therefore	  aims	  to	  understand	  the	  mechanisms	  
of	  rent	  capture	  in	  EPZ/SEZ,	  focusing	  on	  the	  opportunities	  to	  reduce	  corruption/rent-­‐seeking	  
offered	  by	  incentive	  restructuring	  and	  coalition	  building	  between	  powerful	  organisations	  in	  
the	  private	  sector	  willing	  to	  invest	  in	  Tanzania,	  and	  government	  officials	  under	  pressure	  to	  
deliver	  a	  more	  productive	  allocation	  of	  rents.	  In	  building	  this	  coalition,	  the	  project	  will	  
address	  the	  organisational	  heterogeneity	  of	  firms	  within	  EPZ/SEZ	  and	  both	  market-­‐
constraining	  and	  state-­‐constraining	  corruption	  dynamics.	  	  
Finally,	  under	  the	  health	  sector	  we	  will	  look	  at	  pharmaceutical	  production,	  and	  the	  reasons	  
underpinning	  its	  decline	  in	  Tanzania.	  A	  series	  of	  interacting	  factors,	  some	  external,	  some	  
policy-­‐influenced	  and	  corruption-­‐related,	  have	  driven	  this	  decline.	  VAT	  on	  inputs	  (with	  slow	  
reimbursement),	  combined	  with	  difficulties	  pharmaceutical	  manufacturers	  experience	  in	  
obtaining	  exemption	  from	  duties,	  delays	  by	  TFDA	  in	  testing	  and	  registering	  products,	  and	  
unfair	  competition,	  have	  discouraged	  investments	  and	  led	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  sector.	  
Specifically,	  local	  firms	  are	  moving	  out	  of	  production	  of	  basic	  affordable	  medicines	  (e.g.	  basic	  
antibiotics),	  as	  import	  prices	  had	  fallen	  below	  local	  production	  costs,	  or	  even	  below	  full	  
materials	  costs,	  suggesting	  the	  dumping	  of	  Asian	  production,	  smuggling	  and	  risks	  associated	  
with	  counterfeiting.	  The	  study	  will	  aim	  at	  tracking	  these	  corruption-­‐related	  processes	  and	  
identify	  a	  combination	  of	  policy-­‐supporting	  local	  producers	  via	  public	  procurement,	  while	  
enforcing	  counterfeiting	  regulations.	  The	  government	  is	  already	  considering	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  
procurement	  of	  medicine	  and	  collective	  action	  among	  local	  producers	  could	  be	  mobilised	  to	  
reduce	  smuggling	  and	  counterfeiting.	  Our	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  by	  supporting	  the	  local	  
producers	  via	  procurement	  reforms,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  align	  government	  and	  private	  
sector	  interests	  in	  view	  of	  reducing	  smuggling	  of	  drugs	  and	  counterfeiting.	  	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Tanzania:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
57	  
6. References	  
Aiko,	  R.	  2015.	  Tanzanians	  perceive	  ineffective	  fight	  against	  corruption,	  say	  citizen	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play.	  
Afrobarometer	  Dispatch	  No.	  48.	  Available	  <	  http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/	  
Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno48_corruption_in_tanzania.pdf>	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  2011.	  Manufacturing	  Agrarian	  Change:	  Agricultural	  production,	  inter-­‐sectoral	  learning	  and	  
technological	  capabilities,	  DRUID	  Working	  paper,	  n.	  11-­‐13,	  1-­‐39.	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  2014.	  Structural	  Learning:	  embedding	  discoveries	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  production,	  Structural	  
Change	  and	  Economic	  Dynamics,	  29,	  58-­‐74.	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  2017.	  Mapping	  Industrial	  Production	  in	  Tanzania.	  A	  disaggregated	  analysis	  based	  on	  the	  mainland	  
census,	  UNIDO	  Working	  Paper,	  n.	  12-­‐17,	  	  1-­‐	  82.	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  2018.	  ‘A	  Generalised	  Linkage	  Approach	  to	  Local	  Production	  Systems	  Development	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  
Global	  Value	  Chains,	  with	  special	  reference	  to	  Africa’.	  Forthcoming	  in:	  Noman,	  A.,	  Stiglitz,	  J.	  and	  Kanbur,	  R.,	  
(eds.)	  Quality	  of	  Growth	  in	  Africa.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  and	  Scazzieri,	  R.	  2013.	  Triggers	  of	  Change:	  structural	  trajectories	  and	  production	  dynamics’,	  
Cambridge	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  38(6),	  1391-­‐1408.	  
Andreoni,	  A.	  and	  Chang,	  H.-­‐J.	  2017.	  Bringing	  production	  transformation	  and	  jobs	  creation	  back	  development:	  
Alice	  Amsden’s	  legacy	  for	  a	  New	  Developmentalist	  agenda,	  Cambridge	  Journal	  of	  Regions,	  Economy	  and	  
Society,	  10(1):	  173-­‐187.	  
Balchandran,	  P.K.	  1981.	  An	  embattled	  community:	  Asians	  in	  East	  Africa	  today,	  African	  Affairs,	  80,	  320:317-­‐325.	  
Brennan,	  J.	  2012.	  Taifa:	  Making	  Nation	  and	  Race	  in	  Urban	  Tanzania,	  Athens	  OH,	  Ohio	  University	  Press.	  
Citizen.	  2015.	  Missing	  containers	  not-­‐ours	  Bakhressa.	  Available	  <	  http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Missing-­‐
containers-­‐not-­‐ours-­‐Bakhresa/1840340-­‐2983654-­‐13jx79kz/index.html>	  
Citizen.	  2016.	  Tanzania:	  100	  District	  Commissioners	  dropped	  in	  Magufuli	  Reshuffle.	  Available	  <	  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201606271182.html>	  
Citizen.	  2016	  (February).	  Magufuli’s	  sugar	  headache.	  Available	  <	  http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/1840340-­‐
3093228-­‐lpmtehz/index.html>	  
Citizen.	  2016c.	  Tanzania:	  Magufuli	  Now	  Mends	  Ties	  with	  Big	  Business.	  Available:	  
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201610070776.html>	  
Citizen.	  2016d.	  JMP	  blames	  middlemen	  for	  Dangote	  woes.	  Available	  <	  http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/JPM-­‐
blames-­‐midddlemen-­‐for-­‐Dangote-­‐woes/1840340-­‐3482168-­‐format-­‐xhtml-­‐10y74xrz/index.html>	  
Citizen.	  2017.	  Tanzania:	  JPM	  Confirms	  Turkey	  Role	  in	  Railway	  Project.	  Available	  <	  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201701240395.html>	  
Clark,	  E.	  1978.	  Socialist	  Development	  and	  Public	  Investment	  in	  Tanzania.	  Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press.	  
Cooksey,	  B.	  2011.	  Public	  goods,	  rents	  and	  business	  in	  Tanzania,	  Background	  paper	  1,	  Africa	  Power	  and	  Politics	  
Programme.	  
Coulson,	  A.	  1979.	  African	  Socialism	  in	  Practice.	  The	  Tanzanian	  Experience.Nottinghm:	  Spokesman.	  
Coulson,	  A.	  1982.	  Tanzania:	  A	  Political	  Econmy.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Croke,	  K.	  2017.	  Tools	  of	  single	  party	  hegemony	  in	  Tanzania:	  evidence	  from	  surveys	  and	  survey	  experiments,	  
Democratization,	  24(2):	  189-­‐208.	  
East	  African.	  2016.	  Dangote’s	  low	  cement	  prices	  disrupt	  East	  African	  cement	  space.	  Available	  <	  
https://asokoinsight.com/news/dangotes-­‐low-­‐cement-­‐prices-­‐upset-­‐east-­‐african-­‐firms>	  
East	  African.	  2016	  December.	  Tanzania’s	  dilemma	  over	  lucrative	  incentives	  to	  Dangote	  Cement.	  Available	  <	  
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-­‐dilemma-­‐over-­‐lucrative-­‐incentives-­‐to-­‐Dangote-­‐
Cement/2560-­‐3484206-­‐il2v68z/index.html>	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Tanzania:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
58	  
Financial	  Times.	  2016a.	  Tanzania	  wants	  foreign-­‐backed	  telcos	  to	  list.	  Available	  <	  
https://www.ft.com/content/46c7d8d0-­‐3e0e-­‐11e6-­‐9f2c-­‐36b487ebd80a>	  
Financial	  Times.	  2016b.	  Interview	  with	  Tanzanian	  media	  mogul	  Reginald	  Mengi.	  Available	  <	  
https://www.ft.com/content/14f5b22c-­‐41ca-­‐11e6-­‐9b66-­‐0712b3873ae1>	  
Gray,	  H.	  2013.	  Industrial	  policy	  and	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Tanzania:	  aspects	  of	  continuity	  and	  change	  since	  
independence,	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  40(136):	  185-­‐201.	  
Gray,	  H.	  2015.	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Grand	  Corruption	  in	  Tanzania,	  African	  Affairs,	  114	  (456):	  382-­‐403.	  
Green,	  E.	  The	  political	  economy	  of	  nation	  formation	  in	  modern	  Tanzania:	  explaining	  stability	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
diversity,	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  Politics,	  49(2):	  223-­‐244.	  
Guardian.	  2016.	  CCM	  makes	  sweeping	  changes	  to	  bring	  party	  ‘back	  to	  the	  people’.	  Available	  <	  
http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/ccm-­‐makes-­‐sweeping-­‐changes-­‐bring-­‐party-­‐back-­‐people>	  
Haraguchi,	  N.	  2017.	  The	  Importance	  of	  Manufacturing	  in	  Economic	  Development:	  Has	  This	  Changed?,	  World	  
Development,	  Available	  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12.013>	  
Heilman,	  B.	  1998.	  Who	  are	  the	  Indigenous	  Tanzanians?	  Competing	  Conceptions	  of	  Tanzanian	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  
Business	  Community,	  Africa	  Toay,	  45(3-­‐4):	  369-­‐388.	  
Heilman,	  B.	  and	  Ndumbaro,	  L.	  2002.	  Corruption,	  Politics	  and	  Societal	  Values	  in	  Tanzania:	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  
Mkapa	  Administration’s	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Efforts,	  African	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  7(1):1-­‐19.	  
Hirschman,	  A.	  O.	  1958.	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Economic	  Development.	  New	  Haven,	  Conn.:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  
Hodd,	  M.	  and	  Theobald,	  R.	  1996.	  Corruption,	  Development	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Tanzania,	  In:	  Tanzania’s	  
Tomorrow,	  Eastern	  and	  Southern	  African	  Universities	  Research	  Programme,	  Tema	  Publisher.	  
Hyden,	  G.	  and	  Mmuya,	  M.	  2008.	  Power	  and	  Policy	  Slippage	  in	  Tanzania	  –	  Discussing	  National	  Ownership	  of	  
Development,	  Sidastudies,	  n.21,	  1-­‐184.	  
IMF,	  2017.	  Fifth	  Review	  under	  the	  Policy	  Support	  Instrument	  –	  Press	  Release.	  IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  17/13.	  
JamiiForums.	  2015.	  FULL:	  Magufuli	  azungumza	  na	  wafanyabiashara	  Ikulu.	  Available	  <	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vDRYvWfTrw>	  
Kabendera,	  E.	  2016.	  Tanzania’s	  President	  Magufuli:	  man	  of	  the	  people,	  man	  of	  the	  party?.	  Available	  <	  
http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/16/tanzanias-­‐president-­‐magufuli-­‐man-­‐of-­‐the-­‐people-­‐man-­‐of-­‐the-­‐party/>	  
Kaldor,	  N.	  1967.	  Causes	  of	  the	  Slow	  Rate	  of	  Economic	  Growth	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.	  
Kalecki,	  M.	  1976.	  Essays	  on	  Developing	  Economies.	  New	  York:	  Harvester	  Press.	  
Kay,	  C.	  2009.	  Development	  strategies	  and	  rural	  development:	  exploring	  synergies,	  eradicating	  poverty’,	  Journal	  
of	  Peasant	  Studies,	  36(1),	  103	  –137.	  
Kelsall,	  T.	  2003.	  Governance,	  democracy	  and	  recent	  political	  struggles	  in	  Mainland	  Tanzania,	  Commonwealth	  &	  
Comparative	  Politics,	  	  41(2):	  55-­‐82.	  
Khan,	  M.	  2006.	  Determinants	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Developing	  Countries:	  the	  Limits	  of	  Conventional	  Economic	  
Analysis,	  in	  Rose-­‐Ackerman,	  Susan	  (ed.)	  International	  Handbook	  on	  the	  Economics	  of	  Corruption,	  pp.	  216-­‐44,	  
Cheltenham:	  Edward	  Elgar.	  
Khan,	  M.	  2010.	  Political	  Settlements	  and	  the	  Governance	  of	  Growth-­‐Enhancing	  Institutions.	  Research	  Paper	  
Series	  on	  Governance	  for	  Growth.	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,	  University	  of	  London:	  London.	  
Available	  <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968>	  
Khan,	  M.	  2017.	  Knowledge,	  Skills	  and	  Organisational	  Capabilities	  for	  Industrial	  Transformation,	  forthcoming	  in	  
Structural	  Change	  and	  Economic	  Dynamics	  
Khan,	  M.	  and	  Gray,	  H.	  2006.	  State	  weakness	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  strategies	  of	  institutional	  reform	  –	  
Operational	  implications	  for	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Policy	  and	  A	  case	  study	  of	  Tanzania.	  London:	  DFID.	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Tanzania:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
59	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain,	  Antonio	  Andreoni	  and	  Pallavi	  Roy	  2017.	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Adverse	  Contexts:	  A	  
Strategic	  Approach.	  SOAS:	  London.	  Available	  <http://www.ace.soas.ac.uk>	  
Lindemann,	  S.	  and	  Putzel,	  J.	  2008.	  State	  Resilience	  in	  Tanzania.	  London:	  Crisis	  State	  Research	  Centre,	  LSE.	  	  
McMillan,	  M	  and	  Rodrik,	  D.	  2011.	  Globalization,	  structural	  change	  and	  productivity	  growth.	  Tufts	  University	  
and	  Harvard	  Kennedy	  School.	  
MITI	  2016.	  Tanzania	  at	  a	  Crossroad:	  Shifting	  Gears	  Towards	  Inclusive	  and	  Sustainable	  Industrialisation.	  
Tanzania	  Industrial	  Competitiveness	  Report.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  MITI.	  
Mufuruki,	  A.	  2017.	  Magufuli’s	  One	  Year	  in	  Office.	  Available	  <https://ceo-­‐
roundtable.co.tz/uncategorised/magufulis-­‐one-­‐year-­‐office-­‐unwavering-­‐war-­‐graft-­‐op-­‐ed-­‐piece-­‐ceort-­‐chairman-­‐
ali-­‐mufuruki/>	  
National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  2013.	  Census	  of	  Industrial	  Production,	  2013.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  Nbs.	  
Nyerere,	  J.K.	  1968.	  Freedom	  and	  Socialism:	  A	  Selection	  from	  Writing	  and	  Speeches	  1965-­‐1967.	  London:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Paget,	  D.	  2017.	  Tanzania:	  Shrinking	  Space	  and	  Opposition	  Protest.	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  28(3):	  153-­‐167.	  
Philips,	  K.D.	  2010.	  Pater	  rules	  best:	  Political	  kinship	  and	  party	  politics	  in	  Tanzania’s	  presidential	  election.	  
Political	  and	  Legal	  Anthropology	  Review,	  33(1):	  109-­‐132.	  
Ponte,	  S.	  2002.	  Farmers	  and	  Markets	  in	  Tanzania:	  How	  Policy	  Reforms	  Affect	  Rural	  Livelihoods	  in	  Africa.	  James	  
Carrey	  Publisher.	  
REDET.	  2010.	  The	  practicability	  of	  separating	  business	  from	  politics	  in	  Tanzania.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  Redet.	  
Sutton,	  J.	  and	  Olomi,	  D.	  2012.	  An	  Enterprise	  Map	  of	  Tanzania.	  London:	  IGC	  
Tanzanian	  Affairs.	  2016.	  2015	  Elections	  and	  Results.	  Available:	  <https://www.tzaffairs.org/2016/01/>	  
Tanzania	  Affairs.	  2017.	  One	  year	  into	  Magufuli	  presidency	  by	  Ben	  Taylor.	  	  
Available:	  <	  https://www.tzaffairs.org/2017/01/one-­‐year-­‐into-­‐magufulis-­‐presidency/>	  
Taylor,	  J.	  C.	  1963.	  The	  Political	  Development	  of	  Tanganyika.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  
Temu,	  A.	  and	  Due,	  J.	  1998.	  The	  Success	  of	  Newly	  Privatised	  Companies:	  New	  Evidence	  from	  Tanzania,	  Canadian	  
Journal	  of	  Development	  Studies,	  XIX(2):	  315-­‐341.	  
Therkildsen,	  O.	  and	  Bourgoin,	  F.	  2012.	  Continuity	  and	  change	  in	  Tanzania’s	  ruling	  coalition:	  legacies,	  crisees	  and	  
weak	  productive	  capacity,	  DIIS	  Working	  paper	  06.	  
TNBC	  (2017)	  Public-­‐private	  sector	  dialogue	  report,	  10	  May,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  
TPSF	  (2017)	  Presentation	  at	  the	  Public-­‐private	  sector	  dialogue,	  10	  May,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  
Tsubura,	  M.	  2015.	  Does	  clientelism	  help	  Tanzanian	  MPs	  establish	  long-­‐term	  electoral	  support?,	  AFRO	  
Barometer	  Working	  paper	  No.	  159.	  
Twaweza.	  2016.	  The	  People’s	  President.	  Citizens’	  assessment	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  fifth	  phase	  government.	  
Avaialble	  <	  http://twaweza.org/uploads/files/PeoplesPresident-­‐EN-­‐FINAL-­‐A4.pdf>	  
UNCTAD.	  UN	  Comtrade	  database.	  Available	  <	  https://comtrade.un.org/>	  
UNDP.	  2015.	  Work	  for	  Human	  Development.	  Human	  Development	  Report.	  New	  York:	  UNDP.	  
UNIDO.	  2013.	  The	  Industrial	  Competitiveness	  of	  Nations.	  Competitive	  Industrial	  Performance	  Report.	  Vienna:	  
UNIDO.	  
URT.	  1971	  Prevention	  of	  Corruption	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  1995.	  Public	  Leadership	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  1998.	  Warioba	  Report.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2000.	  Tanzania	  Development	  Vision	  2025.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2001.	  Public	  Finance	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Tanzania:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
60	  
URT.	  2002.	  2002	  Public	  Service	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2004.	  2004	  Public	  Procurement	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2006.	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2008.	  Public	  Audit	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2010.	  2010	  Elections	  Expenses	  Act.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
URT.	  2016.	  Second	  Five	  Year	  Development	  Plan	  (FYDP	  II	  2015/16	  –	  2020/21).	  Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  URT.	  
Wangwe,	  S.	  1979.	  Excess	  Capacity	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industry:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Selected	  Firms	  in	  Tanzania.	  In:	  
Kim,	  K.,	  Mabele,	  R.,	  Schultheis,	  M.	  (eds.)	  Papers	  on	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Tanzania.	  Nairobi:	  Heinemann	  
Educational	  Books.	  
World	  Bank.	  World	  Governance	  Indicators.	  Available	  <	  http://data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/worldwide-­‐
governance-­‐indicators>	  
World	  Bank.	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  Available	  <	  http://data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/world-­‐
development-­‐indicators>	  
World	  Economic	  Forum.	  Executive	  Opinion	  Survey.	  Available	  <	  http://reports.weforum.org/global-­‐
competitiveness-­‐index/the-­‐executive-­‐opinion-­‐survey-­‐the-­‐voice-­‐of-­‐the-­‐business-­‐community/	  
About the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium:
ACE takes an  innovative approach to anti-corruption policy and practice. Funded 
by UK aid, ACE is responding to the serious challenges facing people and economies 
affected by corruption by generating evidence that makes anti-corruption real, and 
using those findings to help policymakers, business and civil society adopt new, 
feasible, high-impact strategies to tackle corruption.
ACE is  a partnership of highly experienced research and policy institutes based 
in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom and the USA. The lead 
institution is SOAS, University of London. Other consortium partners are:
• London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)
• Palladium, London
• University of Birmingham
• University of Columbia, New York
• BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), Dhaka
• Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), Dhaka
• James P. Grant School of Public Health BRAC University (JPGSPH), Dhaka
• Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), Dar es Salaam
• Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Dar es Salaam
• Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), Dar es Salaam
• Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Lagos
• Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja
• Health Policy Research Group, University of Nigeria
ACE also has well a established network of leading research collaborators  
and policy/uptake experts.
Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium
SOAS, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H OXG
T +44 (0)20 7898 4447 • E ace@soas.ac.uk • W www.ace.soas.ac.uk
Disclaimer: This publication is an output of a research programme funded by UK aid from the UK 
Government. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
the views of UK Government’s official policies.
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from ACE research for their own publications. As 
copyright holder ACE, requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.
